In this paper, the author goes through considerations that come up when analyzing the prospect of a truly subjective theory of moral language. Certain forms of subjectivism are found to be either less than viable, similar to moral realism, or dependent upon psychological matters of debate. Support for this conclusion comes from Hume’s analysis of beliefs and desires; Wittgenstein’s private language argument; the fact that moral discussion is required; Smith’s theory of converging desires and beliefs within his moral realism; and the influence of community and environment. The discussion advocates a union of desires, moral beliefs, and actions, if subjectivism is to make holistic sense. However, the author remains silent on the relative merits of subjectivism in comparison to a realism or idealism.
Shahrukhi, Ali R.
"Is a Subjective Theory of Moral Language Possible?,"
Episteme: Vol. 9, Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.denison.edu/episteme/vol9/iss1/2