General Rules and the Normativity of Causal Inferences in the First Book of Hume's Treatise

Authors

Joshua Derman, Harvard College

Abstract

In the paper, the author has undertaken the task of illuminating the meanings and connections that constitute Hume’s account of causality. The author’s method is critical, questioning the logical consistency and explanatory power of Hume’s skeptical causality and inference, only to eventually reveal the validity of Hume’s argument. Much of the analysis is spent making sense of the seemingly contradictory or confusing statements Hume makes in his Treatise; lots of examples help this process. The paper includes addressing the paradoxical connection between our internal/subjective general rules and our customs. It also examines the interesting question of how to judge the good or bad character of a potential new custom.

Recommended Citation

Derman, Joshua (1997) "General Rules and the Normativity of Causal Inferences in the First Book of Hume's Treatise," Episteme: Vol. 8, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.denison.edu/episteme/vol8/iss1/3