This paper’s goal is to defend Kant’s version of freedom, in spite of the confusing metaphysical issues that surround Kant’s rational being (who belongs both to the world of phenomena and the world of noumena). Contrary to a certain line of criticism, the author argues for how Kant’s agent manages to be free—how the noumenal agent can affect action in the sensible world. Kant does not believe that our noumenal selves cause the world our phenomenal selves act in. Some readers misunderstand him. And while sure, Kant’s theory gives rise to questions about how our noumenal self can account for changes in an agent’s moral behavior, Kant does not fall victim to logical absurdity. Kant’s goal is to give us freedom to act in a causally connected natural world, not to totally explain how a mysterious version of ourselves affects the entirety of the sensible world.
Kendrick, Heather M.
"Kant and the Noumenal Agent,"
Episteme: Vol. 7, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.denison.edu/episteme/vol7/iss1/3