A Gap in Kim's Eliminative Argument for Reductionism

Authors

Benjamin D. Mooneyham, Kansas State University

Abstract

This paper traces the logical movements in Jaegwon Kim’s philosophy of mind addressed to physicalists. To start, a brief background to the contemporary debate between substance dualists, property dualists, and reductionists is provided. The author then argues that Kim uses inconsistent logic in his argument against non-reductive physicalism, compared with his argument against substance dualism: the pairing problem. It turns out that Kim fails to eliminate substance dualism as a possible theory of mind, in particular as an explanation of mental causation. The author offers a separate argument that would improve Kim’s case.

Recommended Citation

Mooneyham, Benjamin D. (2009) "A Gap in Kim's Eliminative Argument for Reductionism," Episteme: Vol. 20, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.denison.edu/episteme/vol20/iss1/3