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Episteme

Abstract

In this exploration piece, the author attempts to present a clear picture of Husserlian and (pre-Critique of Dialectical Reason) Sartrean phenomenology via a critique of Sartre’s theory of the transcendent ego. Is there is need for a unifying I, or does Sartre’s formulation of consciousness as primordial read more compellingly? Is the ego built by states and actions and vice versa, or does Sartre have the better answer with the ego being constituted through states constituted by consciousnesses? The author points out that Sartre’s positions lead to the problem of consciousness unification. Plus, Sartre’s criticisms of Husserl can be nullified. Furthermore, Sartre’s desire for individual freedom actually betrays him in his response to the supposed hampering of consciousness caused by the pure ego. What’s really at stake is a clear description of the self: the ego’s relation to consciousness.

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