The author provides succinct explications of the relevant literature pertaining to the debate resulting from Turing’s thesis on artificial intelligence. It is argued that Searle’s Chinese room example is refuted by neither the so-called systems reply nor the Extended Mind thesis. Such attempts to defend strong AI err because they rely on altered definitions of concepts that we should not accept. The author, in addition to pointing out the importance of factoring in consciousness, provides several illustrative examples, parallels, and original arguments (including a modified concept of “strong coupling”) in his defense of Searle’s position. The paper concludes with a new thesis concerning the equivocation of mind as capacity and mind as totality, as well a postscript on the nature of meaning.

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