Thomas Nagel offers one of the most compelling skeptical stances on physicalism. But question: Does intraspecies or interspecies subjectivity really pose an intractable problem for a modern physicalist worldview? The author of this paper does not think so and proceeds to reconcile the prima facie disconnect that Nagel does not get beyond. In general, the author provides a defense of scientific insight as well as accurate interpretations of the task of physics. To begin an answer to Nagel, we can critique his theories about the future of science. We can explain away the concern about accounting for the so-called richness of experience. Also, it is important to keep in mind the uneven level of human sense modalities, which, when taken into consideration, transforms Nagel’s concern into a mere vocabulary problem. Finally, the only difficulty Nagel’s famous thesis concerning what-it-is-like to be a bat poses is: a human cannot be a bat. But since it is physical (structural) explanation that best gets-at why humans lack that capacity for knowledge, even this problem works against Nagel’s intuition.

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