This paper analyzes how Bacon and Popper both use metaphors in support of their respective theories of the objectivity of progressive science. The author tracks each thinker’s prevalent use and dependence on metaphors; including Bacon’s appeal to religion and the emerging science of optics, and Popper’s biological analogy and dismissal of Kuhn’s relativistic view of science and knowledge. The author argues that the objectivist theorists are plagued by the fact that metaphors are not objective. It seems we must accept only one of the two: their objectivity claims or their methodological approach of using metaphors. The author prefers the latter but this does not save objectivist theories.
"Metaphors of Objectivity,"
Episteme: Vol. 18
, Article 5.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.denison.edu/episteme/vol18/iss1/5