As a reaction to Dorothy Grover and Robert Brandom, this paper examines semantic concerns about intralinguistic relationships and functions. The author supports Brandom’s interpretation of Grover and argues that the prosentential theory of truth must accept the pronominal theory of reference in order to maintain an anaphoric account of truth. The author uses Brandom’s logic to brand Grover an anaphoric deflationist—whether she intended to be one or not. But Brandom’s appeal to reference only begins the project of extending Grover. What other anaphoric mechanisms still need to be identified, the author asks? How do we account for notions of substantive truth and reference? The author answers this second question: the phrase “is true” in prosentences can be basically replaced by “is the truth”; likewise, “refers” can be replaced by “reference” without abandoning the anaphoric function of the complex pronoun. Still, though, it is worrisome that anaphoric deflationism presupposes the exclusion of substantive truth and reference.

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