Kant’s first critique is hard to understand, but this author endeavors to bring-out and/or extend aspects of it so that Kant’s system might better account for the existence of consciousnesses as particular subjectivities. The author’s argument about Kant incorporates many connected concerns: the nature of consciousness; the distinction between pure and practical reason; the role intersubjectivity has to play in positing freedom and in bridging subject and object; the foundations of otherness and subjectivity; the relation between being and knowing; and, outer experience and inner sense. In short, the author holds that Kant’s theory produces subjects either too similar or too different if we totally ignore the role that the noumenal realm plays in his ontology. The author suggests a reading of “consciousness of” that is a fusion of the noumenal self and the phenomenal self, saving the general drift of Kant’s potentially incoherent thought. This proposal better fits our experience of space-time and our metastable knowledge there-of. To close, the author reveals a model that depicts the cognitive process of any human as stages in a continuum.
Episteme: Vol. 1
, Article 7.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.denison.edu/episteme/vol1/iss1/7