The author of this article critiques the exegesis offered in Neo-Kantian interpretations of Hegel coming from Klaus Hartmann, David Kolb, and Robert Pippin. They all suppose a thought/object dualism that Hegel rejects, and they all-too-easily “forgive” Hegel of philosophizing outside the bounds of the interpretation they use to describe his general thought. They offer interpretations of Hegel that answer Kantian transcendentalist questions, not ontological questions, which is in part due to their fixation on rigor, which binds them and limits their understanding. Even though the Logic is the most susceptible to a Kantian reading, the author argues for how such a reading still misses key aspects of the Logic. Importantly, Hegel’s hermeneutical guidance allows us to pick out elements in such misguided interpretations, in terms of alignment and misalignment with Hegel’s thought. If we turn to the Unhappy Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, we see support for a monist reading of Hegel.
"Hartmann, Kolb, Pippin and the Unhappy Consciousness,"
Episteme: Vol. 5
, Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.denison.edu/episteme/vol5/iss1/6