

# Carving Out Space for Aristotle's *Megalopsychos*

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The *megalopsychos*<sup>[1]</sup> is the most reviled of Aristotle's virtuous characters today, but he was a paragon of virtue in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE. Other virtues that Aristotle praised such as courage, generosity, and temperance are still recognized as excellent and worthy of striving to reach. A *megalopsychos* is defined simply as someone "who thinks himself worthy of great things and *is* worthy of them" (1123b2-3),<sup>[2]</sup> though what exactly it means to be worthy of great things is open to some interpretation. Although Aristotle draws his portrait against the backdrop of Ancient Athens, where some groups of people were accepted as categorically inferior to others, nothing in this definition requires that the *megalopsychos* can only exist in such a society. Alasdair MacIntyre points to Aristotle's complacency with his social order and suggests that "it is perhaps no accident he also believes that some men are slaves by nature."<sup>[3]</sup> If we reject what Aristotle says about natural slaves, we should also be able to reject other inequalities in the social context he describes without having to reject his valuable insights about virtue. For the virtue of *megalopsychia* to have relevance today, it is not necessary that we accept it in the same form that Aristotle endorsed over two thousand years ago. If the defining features of *megalopsychia* – greatness and correct self-evaluation of greatness – are still useful concepts, then *megalopsychia* is still worth thinking about.

Most modern critics, however, would deny that the defining features of *megalopsychia* are useful to us. Nancy Sherman and Alasdair MacIntyre, in particular, argue that there is no place for the *megalopsychos* today because he is exempt from ordinary morality and because he essentially belongs to a society of unequals.<sup>[4]</sup> We have strong reasons for wanting people in our community to share our conceptions of morality and (even more importantly) not to want them to undermine the state of equality that we strive to reach. If *megalopsychia* implied either of those things, we could reasonably consider it a vice. In response to Sherman and MacIntyre, I will argue that we *can* carve out space for the virtue of the *megalopsychos* today by diffusing the objections that he is exempt from ordinary morality and that he belongs only to a society of unequals. Far from it being an obsolete virtue that we should now shun, I will argue that we should instead embrace

*megalopsychia* as an admirable contemporary virtue that still has much to teach us about reaching toward the good and about self-understanding.

I. Objection: the *megalopsychos* is exempt from ordinary morality

Let us assume that someone who considers himself exempt from ordinary morality is unattractive because he undermines our confidence in our own morality, he cannot be relied upon to do “the right thing,” and we have difficulty relating to him. An interpretation of the *megalopsychos* as exempt from ordinary morality, I will suggest, rests on a misunderstanding of what motivates him, namely that he is more moved by personal honor (which, let us assume, is not a permissible motivation under ordinary morality) than by good (which is). On my view the *megalopsychos* is correctly understood as motivated by the good; this objection is therefore not compelling. I do not spell out what ordinary morality is exactly but assume that there is such a thing that most people would not reasonably object to. Various conceptions of the good fit into ordinary morality and my argument does not rest on a specific account of it. The objection is clearly articulated by Nancy Sherman, who contends that “acting from grand scale virtues exempts an agent from ordinary moral service.”<sup>[5]</sup> Her criticism is similar to others that Howard Curzer responds to, including that the *megalopsychos* is ungrateful and manipulative; inactive and remote; self-absorbed; and unsympathetic, inaccessible, and insufficiently benevolent.<sup>[6]</sup> Sherman’s primary evidence that the *megalopsychos* is exempt is Aristotle’s comment that, “it is characteristic of the [*megalopsychos*] not to aim at things commonly held in honor, or the things in which others excel; to be sluggish and hold back except where great honor or great work is at stake, and to be a man of few deeds, but of great and noble ones” (1124b13-15). To Sherman, his infrequent performance of great actions is an excuse for the *megalopsychos* to neglect “ongoing and persistent concern for the welfare of others”<sup>[7]</sup> and instead focus on actions that will bring him the greatest honor. For Sherman, the *megalopsychos*’ grand actions are inherently motivated by his desire to be honored. She characterizes him as of “the sort that typically reap honor, that will befit his position and importance. He does not easily surrender moments for such display.” As a result, “the scope of his desire to help is restricted” by his desire for opportunities to act in ways that will bring him honor.<sup>[8]</sup>

While it is true that the *megalopsychos*, as Aristotle describes him, is particularly concerned with honor (1123b16 and 1124a13), Sherman is mistaken about the form of that concern. Far from being a motivation, honor and external recognition are merely effects of being good; he wants honor only as confirmation of his goodness. He pursues

the good because he *just is* good (it would be an “utter absurdity” for him not to be good (1123b34)), not because the rewards that follow from pursuing the good (such as being honored) are independently pleasant. Aristotle is careful to mention that the *megalopsychos* does not consider honor to be “a very great thing” (1124a18). He merely accepts it as his just desert, being pleased when it comes from sources that he considers capable of recognizing honor (“good men”) and unmoved when it comes from those he deems incapable of recognizing it (“casual people”) (1123b18 and 1124a10-13). If the *megalopsychos*’ focus on actions that will bring him honor is interpreted as a focus on the actions that aim at the greatest good rather than on those that are most rewarded, then his motivation is no longer outside the scope of ordinary morality. A careful reading of Aristotle’s description of the *megalopsychos* suggests that he is better understood as motivated by the good than by personal honor.

Translations may affect our reading of what seems to motivate the *megalopsychos*. For example, the word *kataphronei*<sup>[9]</sup> is roughly “looking down” in English.<sup>[10]</sup> Michael Pakaluk translates it as, “Because the great-hearted man shows contempt, with justification, since he has a true assessment of things,”<sup>[11]</sup> while Christian Rowe translates, “For the great-souled person is justified in looking down on people (since his judgements are true).”<sup>[12]</sup> Because, as Pakaluk notes, *kataphronei* does not have a grammatical object in Greek, one can *kataphronei* without doing so to specific individuals.<sup>[13]</sup> Rowe’s translation suggests that the *megalopsychos* is thought here essentially comparative, while Pakaluk’s does not. Another example is *hyperechein*, from *hyper* (more) and *echo* (to have). David Ross translates that “the proud man wishes to be superior,”<sup>[14]</sup> while Pakaluk renders, “the point is to excel.” Pakaluk comments that *hyperechein* “is not meant to imply comparison with others;” it means “to excel *over oneself*: to do something, obviously available to you, that would make your doing the other alternative presenting itself to you—perhaps the easier alternative—look to be something inferior.”<sup>[15]</sup> The word “superior” again brings in an element of comparison that Aristotle may not have intended and suggests what I suspect is an inappropriate self-centeredness. These modern connotations might make us view *megalopsychia* in ways Aristotle did not intend.

Turning to the text, Aristotle defines the *megalopsychos* as a person “who thinks himself worthy of great things and *is* worthy of them” (1123b2). Greatness is not categorically different from goodness but is rather a great quantity of goodness – possessing very many good virtues and possessing them to a high degree. Given the textual context, Curzer suggests that those great things are “the external goods (wealth, power, beauty,

honor, etc.).”<sup>[16]</sup> This definition is puzzling because the *megalopsychos* is supposed to be above caring about external goods, which are only instrumentally rather than intrinsically good: he will “bear himself with moderation towards wealth and power and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither overjoyed by good fortune nor over-pained by evil” (1124a14-17). In fact, Aristotle suggests that having great things is only meaningful when it reflects being honored: “Everything that has a superiority in good is held in greater honor... but in truth the good man alone is to be honored” (1124a23). Similarly, being honored is only important insofar as it is a marker of being virtuous: although individuals with great wealth will be honored by some, “those who without virtue have such goods are neither justified in making great claims nor entitled to the name of [*megalopsychos*]; for these things imply perfect virtue” (1124a26-29). What is really at issue with the greatness of the *megalopsychos* is that *he himself* must be good. My argument is that the material goods part, though part of how Aristotle defines the virtue, is not essential<sup>[17]</sup>. Rather, it points to something essential to the virtue: goodness and possession of other virtues. This interpretation is supported by Aristotle’s explicit statement that “the truly [*megalopsychos*] must be good. And greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a [*megalopsychos*]” (1123b29).

Aristotle uses external goods in his definition to mean the same thing as goodness because in his society external goods, virtue, and honor were all connected. He observes that, “men who are well-born are thought worthy of honor, and so are those who enjoy power or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and everything that has a superiority in some good is held in greater honor” (1124a23). But Aristotle subsequently undermines the validity of this connection in claiming that “in truth the good man alone is to be honored” and “those who without virtue have such goods are neither justified in making great claims nor entitled to the name of [*megalopsychos*]; for these things imply perfect virtue” (1124a24-29). His first claim that virtue and honor are connected reflects the social conventions he observed, while the second claim that only the good man should be honored reflects philosophical reasoning about the implications of virtue. In response to the tension between the two claims, it makes sense to reject the first in favor of the second. The second follows from reasoning about what virtue is, while the first is only correct in a certain social context.

Interpretations like Sherman’s likely result from overlooking the important distinction between *being* honored and *being worthy of* honor. Only the latter is important for the *megalopsychos*, although the connection between external goods and honor depends on the former. Nor is being worthy of honor important in itself. *Megalopsychoi* care about being worthy of honor *because it is an indication of what they really care about*, being

virtuous: “honor is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered,” (1123b35) and “not even toward honor does [the *megalopsychos*] bear himself as if it were a very great thing” (1124a17). Aristotle concludes that “power and wealth are desirable for the sake of honor” (1124a18) and separately seems to recognize that honor is desirable only insofar as it indicates being virtuous. Being worthy of great things (such as power and wealth) is therefore desirable because it indicates being virtuous, which is, after all, what the truly good person aims at. A defining feature of the *megalopsychos* is not that he is, and knows he is, worthy of great external goods, but rather that he is, and knows he is, virtuous. I will take up the question of what makes *megalopsychia* a distinct virtue in the final section.

We might question Aristotle’s claim that “it makes no difference whether we consider the state of the character or the man characterized by it” (1123b1). The state of the character describes what is essential about the *megalopsychos*, while the man characterized by it is the product of that character living in a specific society. If Aristotle only considers the *megalopsychos* in his own society, his conflation of being honored with being worthy of honor is not hugely consequential. But I aim to consider the modern *megalopsychos*, removed from Aristotle’s context. It makes a difference to that endeavor whether I consider the character itself or the (socially placed) man characterized by it. Let us assume that people today do not accord honor on the basis of power and wealth in the same way (in fact, we sometimes think powerful and wealthy people are more likely than average to be morally corrupt), so the goods-honor connection is lost. From my interpretation of Aristotle’s text, virtue (part of pursuit the good) is the *megalopsychos*’ motivation, not personal honor. Thinking that the *megalopsychos* is motivated by honor implies a connection between honor, goodness and virtue, that we may no longer consider valid.

If he is not motivated by personal honor, then there is little textual evidence to support the idea that the *megalopsychos* considers himself exempt from the demands of ordinary morality. As noted above, he will “be a man of few deeds, but of great and noble ones” (1124b25). As such, he is willing to face great dangers for the sake of important things, but not willing to undertake “trifling” dangers for the sake of less important things (1124b8). He may perform acts that are greater than what we typically do in our everyday lives (he may end up risking his life for the sake of justice, for example, because his acts that are more purely motivated by consideration of the good than by personal concerns ), but that does not entail that he is acting on a different morality. That he chooses to act on moral considerations even when there is much at stake instead of only when the risks to acting morally are trifling does not mean that he adheres to a morality that disregards the welfare of other people as trivial, or that he uses his great acts as an excuse for not performing more trivial acts. As even Sherman recognizes, we cannot help everyone. We must discriminate between possible actions. Her concern is

that the *megalopsychos* makes those discriminations on the basis of the wrong reasons and motivations. I have argued that there is no reason to think that he does. If discriminations are made on the basis of what will be the most good rather than on the basis of considering other people unimportant or a reflection of what will bring him the most prestige, then it is not inconsistent with ordinary morality that the *megalopsychos* may act in ways that other people recognize as good and for which they may even honor him.

II. Objection: the *megalopsychos* is “essentially a member of a society of unequals”

Being incompatible with a society of equals is an even more troubling objection for the *megalopsychos*. If he is essentially a member of a society of unequals, then the *megalopsychos*’s existence in our society suggests that our society is not and cannot be a society of equals. Alasdair MacIntyre makes this objection by arguing that the *megalopsychos* is “essentially a member of a society of unequals” because his “characteristic attitudes require a society of superiors and inferiors in which he can exhibit his peculiar brand of condescension.”<sup>[18]</sup> In the society in which Aristotle finds himself, it is certainly true that the *megalopsychos* acts on the recognition that certain others are inferior to him. But for this objection to be compelling, it needs to explain why inequality is bad and what it means to be equals in society. MacIntyre’s objection does not spell out either. Set against an account of equality that locates the harm of inequality as standing in the way of the kind of human relationships that are necessary to flourishing and that defines equality as relational political equality, I would suggest that the specific inequality in goodness that the *megalopsychos* is essentially part of does not cause the harmful kind of political relational inequality that obstructs human flourishing. In other words, the *megalopsychos* is not essentially a member of a society of relational political unequals, so the thought that he might be essentially a part of inequality in something else, like goodness, is not troubling.

A possible response to MacIntyre’s objection is to argue that while some of the attitudes that Aristotle attributes to the *megalopsychos* can only exist in a society of unequals, those “characteristic attitudes” are not defining character traits. Rather, they are characteristics of the *megalopsychos* in the specific society in which he is described. These attitudes include despising honors offered by common people, not caring to conceal his opinion because he has a poor opinion of others, and always repaying benefits with interest so as to remain in the position of a benefactor. Someone who possesses *megalopsychia* (understood as being good and knowing that he is good) in a different society that lacks relations of superiority would not share those same attitudes.

This line of argument can at most show that the *megalopsychos* can exist in some particular idealized society. I would like to suggest that he can exist in *our* society. To support that claim, I must argue that he is compatible with the specific type of equality that might be said to (ideally) characterize our society. Consider one conception of relational political equality along the lines of Elizabeth Anderson's conception of democratic equality.<sup>[19]</sup> She argues that egalitarians seek to live in a democratic (rather than hierarchical) society where people are collectively self-determined through open discussion among equals and governed by rules acceptable to all. People stand in equality to each other through discussion: each member of society is entitled to participate,<sup>[20]</sup> other members recognize an obligation to listen and respond respectfully, and nobody need represent themselves as inferior to make their claims heard. For Anderson, equality is essentially relational and ensures fair treatment in the political process. This theory is attractive because it affirms that all people have worth and have a voice, while still allowing that they may differ substantially in their talents, virtues, and other individual characteristics. Traits that we intuitively think have moral significance, such as kindness and generosity, may indeed have moral importance elsewhere, but they are not relevant to this form of equality.

At the same time, political relational equality captures what is most harmful about inequality. Samuel Scheffler suggests that we find equality valuable "because we believe that there is something valuable about human relationships that are, in certain crucial respects at least, unstructured by differences in rank, power, or status."<sup>[21]</sup> If every citizen relates to one another as an equal citizen with an equal right to participate in political deliberation (regardless of whether she exercise that right), then this unstructured relationship will necessarily exist between every person in society, at least in an important political sense. One account of human flourishing takes living collaboratively with others as necessary to reach one's full potential. If humans are by nature social and if we need to live free from stifling relationships to fully engage socially, then the kind of inequalities that prevent our forming unstructured relationships also prevent our human flourishing. Political institutions influence much of our social interactions. Patterns of political privilege and deference therefore color much of our personal relationships, too. Privilege and deference undermine the self-respect of those in the inferior position and inflate the others' sense of superiority in a way that corrupts their mutual human relationships and prevents those in the inferior position from recognizing and fulfilling their own full potential. A regime of equality under which every citizen relates to each other as at least equally entitled to participate in political deliberations creates a buffer against the harmful inequalities that undermine self-respect and prevent flourishing.

A more interesting response to MacIntyre's objection about the *megalopsychos*' essential incompatibility with a society of equals that is sensitive to the sketch of equality given above argues that the objection only looks concerning because the terms "superior", "inferior", and "equals" are left unspecified. Inequality, with its inherent relations of inferiority and superiority, only becomes a problem when it undermines people's relational standings of political equality, that is, when it results in certain people being excluded from political discussions because they are not entitled to participate and others do not recognize a responsibility to listen respectfully. On the view that I am considering, recognition that some people do while others do not possess *megalopsychia* does not affect individuals' standing to participate in the deliberative process. Superiority in goodness is not relevant to and therefore does not undermine one's ability to contribute to that process. And because it does not undermine one's ability to participate in the process, it should not affect the how individuals are listened to in democratic deliberations either.

As grounds for being excluded from political discussion, Anderson specifies "communicative incompetence" and unwillingness to participate respectfully.<sup>[22]</sup> There is nothing essential to inequalities in virtue that means that they must lead to political relational inequality. It is certainly a problem if less virtuous people happen to be treated disrespectfully in political deliberations even though they are perfectly qualified to participate – if their comparatively lesser virtue is used as a reason to discriminate against them. But that would be the reflection of a greater problem in that society, not a direct consequence of the existence of *megalopsychia*. *Megalopsychia* does not depend on or in itself necessarily cause political disrespect.

However, it might still be a problem that the *megalopsychos* "is given to telling the truth, except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar" (1124b30-31). Hiding the truth from someone, even if telling the truth would be "as vulgar as a display of strength against the weak" (1124b23) assumes that someone is not worthy of the truth. In a political deliberation, withholding it from someone does not respect that person as capable of dealing with the truth and thereby of fully participating in communal deliberation. The excuse that the *megalopsychos* acts in this way to spare the feelings of the less virtuous person is not enough to justify the action. In practice, the *megalopsychos*' tendency to be "unassuming towards those of the middle class" (1124b19) and not to call attention to his superiority may partially offset the effects of his disrespect, but it cannot obviate it completely. Even if possible disrespectful deception about the *megalopsychos*' superiority is an open issue, specifying the relevant kind of equality as political relational inequality significantly limits how much of a problem the existence of a *megalopsychos* can pose in what would otherwise be a society of equals. It thus takes away much of the force of the objection that the *megalopsychos* is essentially incompatible with a society of equals.



### III. What we can learn from the *megalopsychos*

*Megalopsychia* is unique among Aristotle's other virtues in not relating directly to how people act. Unlike courage, temperance, and generosity, which are distinguished by courageous, temperate, and generous acts performed from the corresponding dispositions, *megalopsychia* is distinguished by possession of the other virtues to a great degree. Aristotle likens *megalopsychia* to an ornament that decorates goodness but cannot cause it, describing it as "a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater and is not found without them" (1124a1). The *megalopsychos* is good in the same *kinds* of ways that people who possess other virtues are good, but he is different in the extent of his virtues and because he possesses so many at once. He is properly called great, not simply good, because his goodness is on a scale large enough to distinguish it from ordinary goodness. He is not concerned to "aim at the things commonly held in honor" but instead acts in situations where "great work is at stake" (1124b24). The effect of his lofty aims is that he does things that ordinary people would not do – he may be a visionary who undertakes projects so important and far-reaching that they have resounding social benefits or change a society's trajectory. Curzer likens the *megalopsychos* to a Homeric hero and suggests that they are uncommon enough for most of us not to know any.<sup>[23]</sup> He is the kind of epic figure that should be admired, not admonished, in his rare instantiations. The rarity of *megalopsychia* does not diminish its importance in contemporary thought, however. Even those of us who are not ourselves great can learn from the *megalopsychos*. In particular, we can strive to emulate his motivation from the good and his self-understanding of particular goodness. The part of *megalopsychia* that reaches for the good (through aiming at virtue) models a view about coincident self-improvement through striving for the good that has fallen out of fashion. For the *megalopsychos*, reaching for the good is a worthy individual pursuit, not a way to display superiority over others. The fact that reaching for the good is an individual pursuit initially comes off as uncomfortably self-absorbed in a world where we are more used to following an ethics of duty that more explicitly refers to other people. But the self-improvement that *megalopsychia* advocates is not actually motivated by the self. It is motivated by the sake of the good, which exists beyond the self. Just as honor may come as a coincident effect of being good, the self coincidentally will be improved through striving for the good. Acting as a *megalopsychos* will also coincidentally benefit other people: as a consequence of acting courageously or being a better friend (both are ways of pursuing the good), one will end up performing many of the same actions required by duties to other people. *Megalopsychia* gives us a model of acting for the sake of the good that encourages us to reflect and understand what the good is, rather than more simply acting within the set constraints of duty. It does result

in self-improvement, but through a reorientation toward the sake of the good and away from what is demanded by morality of every individual.

Thinking about *megalopsychia* as seeking the good also reminds us that being good and seeking self-improvement need not be comparative or competitive. While *megalopsychia* is a virtue, its absence is not a vice. *Megalopsychia* is good in that it “makes [the other virtues] greater” (1125a25) and encourages worthy people to strive to meet their full potential (1125a25-30). But the vain and the unduly humble (the respective vices of over- and under-evaluation of greatness) who lack *megalopsychia* “are not thought to be bad (for they are not evildoers) but only mistaken” (1125a18). Lacking *megalopsychia* is not enough to mark one as a bad person. There is an asymmetry: while it is a positive thing to possess more *megalopsychia*, it is not a deeply negative thing to possess less of it. There is no threshold above which one is “good,” and below which one is “bad.”

Rather, embracing *megalopsychia* means embarking on a continual quest for improvement through reaching closer to the good. This approach has the advantage over more conventional ways of thinking about duties and obligations that by being less prescriptive, it is less stressful and punitive and encourages people to never settle as having completed their duties.

The *megalopsychos*’ self-understanding of his goodness offers another important lesson about setting appropriate aspirations. Being unduly humble, far from being a virtue, actually makes a person worse. Aristotle asserts that “each class of people aims at what corresponds to its worth,” (1125a25) (or at least what it thinks to be its worth). Someone who does not recognize that he is worthy of good things sets inappropriately low goals and thereby “robs himself of what he deserves” (1125a20). Conversely, vain people with an inflated sense of self attempt inappropriately grand actions “and then are found out” (1125a30). The *megalopsychos*, in contrast, accurately assesses his great worth and so sets ambitious goals that he is able to meet. The *megalopsychos* teaches us to develop an awareness of our own capabilities: set our aspirations too low and we will not meet our full potential; but set out aspirations too high and we will be exposed as unworthy of them. While not everyone can be a *megalopsychos* because not everyone is good in the highest degree, everyone can nonetheless understand her own goodness and act in accordance with it.

Despite Aristotle’s praise of them as “good in the highest degree” (1123b27), *megalopsychoi* are not perfect. They are excessively concerned with their relationships to others, which makes them “seem also to remember any service they have done, but not those they have received (for he who receives a service is inferior to him who has done it, and the proud man wishes to be superior)” (1124b13). Their peculiar forgetfulness comes from being ashamed to admit inferiority to one’s benefactor and stands in the way of complete self-knowledge. Unlike the *megalopsychos*, we should be appropriately humble to recognize our own shortcomings and not allow concern with self-image to

eclipse self-understanding. Although he has faults, such as hiding his goodness to those he deems less good and allowing his shame partly to cloud his self-understanding, he is not nearly as unappealing as objections that he is exempt from ordinary morality and that he is essentially of a society of unequals might initially make him seem. But despite his flaws, he is uniquely able to perform grand-scale acts of goodness. That and his devotion to the good for the sake of the good rather than for self-serving reasons, his compatibility with a noncompetitive view of morality, and his highly developed if imperfect self-understanding are enough to make him admirable in many respects. We would be better off today if we embraced the positive lessons that we can learn from the *megalopsychos* instead of rejecting everything about him because his superiority in virtue initially makes us uncomfortable.

## Notes

[1] No word in English precisely describes the character Aristotle describes. Various authors have suggested such “proud”, “magnanimous”, “great-hearted”, and “great-souled”, but I follow Curzer in leaving the term untranslated rather than use a translation that carries irrelevant or inappropriate connotations.

[2] Line numbers refer to Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford University Press 2009).

[3] Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 79.

[4] MacIntyre and Nancy Sherman, “Common Sense and Uncommon Virtue,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 13 (1998)

[5] Sherman 103.

[6] Howard Curzer, “Aristotle’s Much Maligned Megalopsychos,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 69, no. 2 (1991): 134, 138, and 142

[7] Sherman 105

[8] Sherman 111

[9] At 1124b4-6, in discussion of differences between the truly and only apparently *megalopsychos*

[10] Etymology information primarily from Wiktionary and other online Greek dictionaries.

[11] Michael Pakaluk, “The Meaning of Aristotelian Magnanimity,” in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 36, ed. David Sedley (2004): 251.

[12] Christian Rowe, quoted in Pakaluk 264

[13] Pakaluk 264

[14] 1124b10

[15] Pakaluk 270-271

[16] Curzer 132

[17] Although if it were, it would follow that the extent to which *megalopsychia* is important for social relationships depends in part on how important it is to have great things. I could probably take a different approach, focusing on external goods, and still conclude that the *megalopsychos* can live in a society of equals so long as material goods do not influence people's standing in relations of equality to each other.

[18] MacIntyre 78

[19] Elizabeth Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" *Ethics* 109, no. 2 (1992): 313.

[20] Everyone is entitled to be listened to respectfully at least until they prove themselves incapable of participating. Nobody can be ruled incapable without first being given a fair hearing.

[21] Samuel Scheffler, "Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality," *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* 4, no. 1 (2005): 17

[22] Anderson 313

[23] Curzer 150

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