Problems of Kierkegaard’s Poetics

Thomas Gilbert

Though Søren Kierkegaard’s theology dissertation, *On the Concept of Irony*, represents the very beginning of his authorship, its substance displays a remarkable thematic uniformity with both the late pseudonymous works as well as his signed *Edifying Discourses*. In this work, Kierkegaard criticizes the German Romantics’ extensive and sustained use of literary irony in order to define selfhood. This irony manifests itself especially in the writings of Schlegel and Fichte, whose characters are often unconstrained by conventional morality and manage to both subsume and lampoon its tenets within their far-reaching critiques of bourgeois society. Kierkegaard reveals his disgust with Schlegel’s *Lucinde* in unusually personal language:

> It is not only the tame ducks and geese...that beat their wings and utter a terrifying cry when they hear the wild birds of love whistling by overhead. No, it is every more deeply poetic person...[who] must endeavor to show that to live is something different from to dream.¹

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He further discusses at length the exact stylistic trait of *Lucinde* that he finds so offensive:

> Were it possible to imagine that the whole of *Lucinde* were merely a caprice... who then would be so ridiculous as not to laugh at it? But this is not the case. [Its] audacity... is so amiable and interesting that ethics, modesty, and decency, which at first glance have some attraction, seem rather insignificant entities by comparison.²

If we ignore the rhetorical irony Kierkegaard himself has weaved into his hermeneutic, we begin to sense the nature of his resentment: it is precisely because *Lucinde* is meant to be taken seriously that Kierkegaard denounces it as amoral. For Kierkegaard, the novel expresses an unholy conflation of ethics and Romantic aesthetics. The young philosopher wants these categories properly differentiated, as he explains in a key later passage:

> Poetry is a kind of reconciliation, though not the true reconciliation... Instead, it reconciles me with the given actuality by giving me another actuality, a higher and more perfect... it often becomes no reconciliation at all but rather animosity. Only the religious, therefore, is capable of effecting the true reconciliation, for it renders actuality infinite for me.³

Furthermore:

> He who enjoys poetically, were he to enjoy the whole world, would still lack one enjoyment: he does not enjoy himself. To enjoy oneself is alone the true infinity.⁴

Though presenting a complicated metaphysical hierarchy, Kierkegaard repeatedly emphasizes that Romantic irony presents a false definition of selfhood: a superficial poeticization of the real world and its faults that can never truly free oneself from the un-
bearably unsatisfactory world that irony lambastes. As we ourselves are agents within the world, our conception of self requires something more than the coy negativity at the heart of _Lucinde_. In this sense, Kierkegaard’s take on Romantic irony grows directly out of his critique of all irony; it is a wonderful tool for dismantling the superficial institutions of society, but refuses to posit anything in return. It leaves one in a state of negative freedom, not able to be serious about oneself and to oneself.

However, Kierkegaard admits that Romantic irony—and by extension, to live aesthetically—remains necessary for one’s personal development. First, it is a crucial tool in the quest to narrate one’s own life, as one requires an ironic viewpoint to achieve enough self-distance to conceive of oneself in relation to other people. Positive self-reflection is thus a form of irony. We must devalue certain moments of our lives and lift up others as moments of profound realization or “turning points.” In forming a relation to myself, “myself” becomes clear to me. Second, even if this self-distance never transcends cold irony, it is necessary to pass through it in order to discover that very coldness, and its internal ethical contradictions relative to an opposite, life-affirming project. This discovery and subsequent redefinition of self represents the well-known Kierkegaardian “spheres of being,” moving from mere citizen to an aesthete to the ethical and finally to the religious. I posit, however, that Kierkegaard’s definitions of the aesthetic and the religious, as outlined in his future career as an author, perform so many of the same functions for one’s identity that the author himself remained in profound intellectual confusion regarding their respective categories. I will trace this confusion through many years of his authorship and a brief discussion of relevant academic work.

Scholar K. Brian Söderquist has argued that Kierkegaard’s conception of religious territory—especially as an answer to aesthetic irony—cannot even be publicly discussed because the debate itself has been moved outside of human categories. Describing Anti-Climacus’ (the pseudonymous author of _The Sickness Unto Death_) analysis of the “defiant poet,” Söderquist argues Kierkegaard “points to inwardness as the solution to overcoming
the inclination to control self-interpretation . . .pointing to psychological territory.” That is, Kierkegaard conceives of the religious as the answer to the aesthete’s ethical problems; through an inexpressible inwardness grounded in God rather than mere “egoism of words,” the pious man can maintain a joyful self-awareness without trying to express that awareness, which would automatically drive him into ironic reflection and mere poetic self-interpretation. However, I instead believe that Kierkegaard did in fact seek a path by which he could both embody and express this religious category—the authorship itself, which he hoped could both poetize religious truth while preserving his own incommunicable inwardness. Kierkegaard attempts this through the dialectical nature of his pseudonymous works and careful, obsessive experimentation with poetizing his own identity. However, as we shall see, even this author-experiment fails to succeed.

Before analyzing several of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works in turn, we will first examine his clearest statement of the author-experiment itself, his unpublished *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*. Speaking in his own name at the culmination of the entire authorship, Kierkegaard directly confronts the relationship between the aesthetic and religious within all of his works. As we cannot know how representative the pseudonyms are of his own beliefs, this late work is vital as a yardstick by which every earlier piece of writing can be judged to fail or succeed on Kierkegaard’s own metric. Describing his project, Kierkegaard acknowledges almost immediately the central conflict among all of his pseudonyms:

> To live only in the unconditional—the human being cannot do this; he perishes like the fish that must live in the air. But on the other hand a human being cannot in the deeper sense live without relating himself to the unconditional; he perhaps goes on living, but spiritlessly.

Just as in *On the Concept of Irony*, Kierkegaard argues that we must both accept ourselves as a coequal part of the material
world while also attaining to the unconditional; pure irony ignores the former entirely. Still, for Kierkegaard the human world remains a “vortex” that provides an illusion of meaning and stability, while in fact it is simply “sewing without fastening the end.” One must relate oneself to something infinite, either through irony or a leap into Christianity, in order to complete the narrative tapestry that bare worldly existence is unable to provide. Yet for both the ironic and the Christian life, the exact balance between actuality and infinitude necessary to create a productive selfhood remains unclear. How much sewing is necessary before the cloth can, or must, be fastened? Or is this a purely individual, subjective decision, immune from Kierkegaard’s attempt to define such a balance? And if so, is Kierkegaard’s ‘not this/nor that’ definition of selfhood anything more than a platitude? He never elaborates, and we are left to wonder if Kierkegaard merely chose to remain ‘joyfully silent’ about the answer to his proffered riddle, or if he is as lost as the rest of us.

In the introduction to *The Point of View* that follows, Kierkegaard gives the reader the indication that even the nature of his authorial project, and not just the lifestyle it endorses, is incomunicable:

> It is self-evident that I cannot present completely an explanation of my work as an author, that is, with the purely personal inwardness in which I possess the explanation. In part it is because I cannot make my God-relationship public in this way, since it is neither more nor less than the universally human inwardness. . .which it would be a crime to suppress and a duty to stress. In part it is because I cannot wish to press upon anyone something that pertains solely to my private character, which of course for me contains much of the explanation of my author-character.  

We must note that Kierkegaard equates his relationship with God to “universally human inwardness”: a purely human category accessible even to the Greeks, who are criticized in *The Sick-
ness Unto Death for lacking a sense of spiritual sin and are thus cursed to a state of unconscious despair. This is therefore an illuminating passage for its ambiguous depiction of “inwardness” as something both separate from and strangely synonymous with the very idea of God. The authorship itself also resides inside Kierkegaard’s “private character” alone, and thus he cannot mediate our question about “inwardness” because the medium in which it was expressed is a part of that same “inwardness.” In poker terminology, we call this a “tell.” If the author-character is essentially no different from his private character (which he refuses to narrate), then it is strikingly unclear to the reader exactly what the authorship is meant to be: either an astonishingly advanced dialectic whose pseudonymous twists and turns do some-how indirectly communicate the correct path to self-identity, or else an expurgated form of personal therapy which Kierkegaard feels un-obligated to unpack for public understanding. If the final goal of the authorship has been to balance a silent, reverent, inward infinity with the flamboyant and expressive demands of aesthetic living, then the answer to the riddle lies only in the works themselves. While The Point of View does address the identity-dilemma Kierkegaard claims to have answered in previous publications, he freely admits that the “author-character” himself cannot perform the same service.

This unresolved tension continues within Part One of The Point of View. While Kierkegaard works hard to convince the reader that his pseudonymous work consistently presented an aesthetic viewpoint, he also claims he always was and remains a religious author. Near the beginning of his “Explanation” he gives a wooden and confusing interpretation of this authorial intentionality:

. . .qua human being I may be justified in making a declaration [on my authorship as a whole], and from the religious point of view it may be my duty to make a declaration. But this must not be confused with the authorship—qua author it does not help very much that I qua human being declare that I have intended this and that. But pre-
sumably everyone will admit that if it can be shown that such and such a phenomenon cannot be explained in any other way, and that on the other hand it can in this way be explained at every point, or that this explanation fits at every point, then the correctness of this explanation is substantiated as clearly as the correctness of an explanation can ever be substantiated.  

In other words, Kierkegaard—unable to use the existing categories of human being or religious duty to express his work—announces the invention of a new, intermediary category: the author, which is the best category simply because, tautologically, it is the “clearest” among all possible alternatives. It seems that, as long as Kierkegaard can justify his works “at every point” as their true author, then even if only he can understand the true nature of his project, the project remains valid—and hence, presents a valid definition of selfhood. The Point of View, then, does lay out Kierkegaard’s summation of his published thought and directly describes its goals; but the justification of those goals, as well as the edifying process of achieving them, can only be experienced through the indirect communication of the pseudonymous works. The Point of View thus accomplishes its intention, which is merely to conceptualize the authorship rather than arbitrate or even explicate the claims of specific works. Kierkegaard believed that to simply spell out the complex balance of selfhood—ironic vs. religious, actuality vs. infinitude—prevents the reader from forming a relation with each element of that balance and thus arriving at the answer. We must therefore turn to Kierkegaard’s key pseudonymous works, each of which presents a different balance in the elements of selfhood. We can then see if each of them presents, at the very least, consistent definitions of philosophical terms and categories. For The Point of View’s argument about the cohesive and unified shape of the authorship to remain plausible, this is the minimum requirement, because dialectic—as well as dialogue—cannot succeed if the different “speakers” or works are not using the same language.
We begin with *Either/Or*, the first major pseudonymous work, containing no less than three distinct voices, one of which—“A”/Johannes the Seducer—represents Kierkegaard’s longest sustained and most incisive depiction of the aesthete in any of his publications. “The Seducer’s Diary” in specific reveals how Johannes plays with the categories of the aesthetic and the religious—and with much more success than Kierkegaard had with Regine Olsen, his relationship with whom is poetically reinterpreted within the Diary. Thus Johannes, rather than lying squarely in the aesthetic realm, actually occupies an ambiguous space between it and the religious as well as Kierkegaard himself; or at least, Johannes’ knowledge of these categories is so great that he can poetize himself into any one of them at will. Kierkegaard’s analysis of the aesthetic qua Johannes, in fact, is so powerful that the author inadvertently begins to tear down his own project—to actually sanctify Johannes.

Our sense of Johannes’ preternatural awareness of the religious comes from Victor Eremita, the textual editor of *Either/Or*, whose introduction to the Diary is a bit too praising of the Seducer’s abilities. While clearly stating that Johannes suffers from a great “sickness,” Eremita also contends that he was “too strong” for reality and that he had “too spiritual a nature to be a seducer in the usual sense.” This hearkens us to the variegated formulas for despair presented by Anti-Climacus in *The Sickness Unto Death*, and if we wish to treat the works as a single dialectic (which *The Point of View* compels us to do), then we must assume that Victor is well past “weak” despair and in an advanced state of defiance before God. But the rub here is Johannes’ spirit: Eremita even repeats that “he lived in far too spiritual a manner to be a seducer in the ordinary sense,” as if in awe of Johannes’ abilities. Cordelia herself admits that Johannes is so spiritual that she feels “annihilated as a woman” when in his presence. And Anti-Climacus, several years later, also states that the highest demand that can be made on man is simply that he becomes spirit. So it is not a good sign that the editor of the whole of *Either/Or*, half of which (Judge Vilhelm’s contribution) is supposed to lie above or beyond the aesthetic in Kierkegaard’s metaphysics,
is reduced to helpless wonder at how spiritual Johannes truly is.

I am assuming here, perhaps unfairly, that Victor Eremita is a double for Kierkegaard himself. Or perhaps in elevating Johannes as highly as possible, Kierkegaard is setting him up for the greatest possible fall. However, there is one more passage from Eremita’s introduction that will verify our doubts about Johannes’ specific place on the irony-religion spectrum. Eremita directly describes the despair of Johannes:

It is not in external respects that he has led the others astray, but in ways that affect them inwardly. . . A person who goes astray inwardly has less room for maneuver; he soon finds he is going round in a circle from which he cannot escape. This, on an even more terrible scale, I think, is how it will go with him. . . he is thus constantly seeking an exit and forever finding an entrance through which he returns into himself.\textsuperscript{14}

In other words, Johannes runs the risk of losing himself in inward infinity— the very territory, as we have seen, that the ironist should be unable to access. We know from \textit{On the Concept of Irony} that the Romantics exist in a state of external infinity while a meaningful depth-of-self remains impossible to achieve. Rather, should Johannes slip into aesthetic despair, then all he would have access to is himself: he would be enjoying himself too much, and would be completely unable to escape the misanthropic games that he enjoys playing with himself and others. Through his godlike command of seduction, Johannes not only “fastens the end” of himself in infinitude but can sew backwards and forwards at will!

Again, strictly speaking, this is not a contradiction on Kierkegaard’s part; Eremita himself offers a rather aesthetic definition of aesthetic despair, with metaphorical foxholes, lights behind half-open doors, and travelers who somehow find themselves back where they began. We can only speculate whether Eremita himself suffers from an inchoate aesthetic fixation, and it is thus improper for us to count this categorical confusion as hard proof
for the aesthete’s access to inward infinity or Kierkegaard’s personal confusion therein. But what does it say about the meta-author himself that during his best opportunity to argue for Johannes’ shortcomings—other than the stuffy logorrhea of Judge Vilhelm—the worst he can come up with is that Johannes might find himself locked inside the paradise accessible only to the religious? We must ask: what then is the difference?

But if Eremita, like Cordelia and even Judge Vilhelm, has been so seduced by Johannes that any criticism they have of him comes off as an aesthetic compliment, the same certainly cannot be said for Anti-Climacus, who is absolutely not an aesthete and openly proclaims in his introduction to The Sickness Unto Death that his essay is meant to be both rigorous and edifying (and not so strong in either category so as to disqualify the other). True, we are still reading a pseudonymous work, though we know from Kierkegaard’s journals that he nearly used his own name to sign the text, deciding otherwise only because he felt Anti-Climacus’s understanding of Christianity is clearer than his own. This authorial detail is especially important, because even Anti-Climacus’s account draws an awkward and blurred line between the aesthetic and the religious, so that Kierkegaard’s position in the mess is not at all clear.

Our relevant passages immediately precede and follow the introduction of Part Two of The Sickness Unto Death, where Anti-Climacus specifically singles out the poetic individual as existing in the highest form of despair—defiance—as well as sin. The last paragraph of Part One reads:

[This despair] is, to describe it figuratively, as if a writer were to make a slip of the pen, and the error became conscious of itself as such. . .and as if this error wanted now to rebel against the author, out of hatred for him forbid him to correct it, and in manic defiance say to him: ‘No, I will not be erased, I will stand as a witness against you, a witness to the fact that you are a second-rate author.’¹⁵
In context this “author” is the god-like force that created the despairing individual, referred to in *The Point of View* as “Governance” and elsewhere in the authorship simply as God: the agent that has determinately established an individual within the world and which has defined that individual’s relation with others and himself. It is when this individual perceives that this “given” relation is somehow deficient that he decides to retreat into the poetic and usurp power from the Establishing Force—to re-forge himself into how he should have been created. Anti-Climacus thus reframes the poetic mindset as rebellion against the will of God. But there is another unintentional “tell” hidden under the surface of this passage. While the aesthete is in rebellion with God, we cannot help but note the unstated communion that he and his Creator share, as dual creators fashioning the world the way each believes it is meant to be. The “writer” here is God—or is it instead the poet, despairing not over himself as an inferior creation under God, but as a creator despairing over his own new creation—himself? If this second interpretation is indeed right, then it is not the rebellion against God which is salient; rather, it is only when the poet rebels against himself that true despair sets in.

And there is yet another level in which God is the one in despair, woefully observing the failure of his human creation to obey its calling in life. Therefore, the poet’s victory is not to perfectly recreate himself and fix God’s mistake—that will come later. The poet’s success comes first when he forces God to blink; in this way, God will fall into despair before the poet himself succumbs upon realizing his own authorial shortcomings. The goal of the desparer is not just to author himself, or to refuse to admit that he is beholden to a creator, but actually to make God realize that the true desparer is He. Beneath the surface of this ostensibly simple anecdote comparing despair to the act of writing, we are actually watching an absurd, multi-tiered game of “Chicken” in which God and the Poet are waiting to see who will despair first. What is therefore crucial for us is that God and the Poet are placed on equal terms; any sense of superior self-conception is ruled out by this harsh and unforgiving dichotomy—presented,
we must remember, through a metaphor about *writing*, authorship, and the ability of fabricated voices to revolt and claim victory over their creators. Kierkegaard himself admitted that Anti-Climacus was the one pseudonym that he *wanted* to be, and it would be entirely in Kierkegaard’s character to engage in this vertiginous level of meta-authorial reflection.

Anti-Climacus offers a further complication with his continued dissection of the poet, early in Part Two:

> . . . the most dialectical border-line case between despair and sin, namely . . . a poet-existence inclined towards the religious. . . He loves God above everything, God who is the only comfort in his secret torment, and yet he loves the torment, he will not let go of it. . . he allows himself poetically to falsify God just a little. . . he wants to hold [his torment] at arm’s length, but that means precisely keeping hold of it. . . His conflict is really this: Has he been called? Is the thorn in the flesh a sign that he is to be put to extraordinary use? . . . Or is the thorn in the flesh what he must humble himself under in order to attain the universally human?16

We notice two slips here: one, the complete de-emphasis on the ethical sphere in Anti-Climacus’s ontology; and two, the despairing ambiguity that Anti-Climacus himself is in regarding the exact root of the poet’s “conflict.” Other Kierkegaardian pseudonyms have explored the territory on the edge of the ethical before departing to the religious—a territory that does require a leap to faith in order to be navigable—but we have been given no indication that the poet can somehow catapult over the ethical to arrive at this point. Indeed, in an endnote to his translation of this passage, scholar Alastair Hannay argues that its disagreement with Kierkegaard’s aesthetic-ethical-religious spheres owes to it being a “clearly autobiographical” addition, and he quotes a passage from the *Journals* where Kierkegaard elaborates on the poet’s despair over God in relation to his own biography.17 Han-
nay is likely correct that Kierkegaard is drawing on personal emotional conflicts to enrich his philosophy, but once again the dialectic of the authorship—if taken as one uniform project—does not leave room for such ambiguities. The glaring absence of the ethical in Anti-Climacus’ analysis, which is not rectified anywhere else in the text, is greatly damaging for the authorship-coherence that The Point of View relies upon.

Anti-Climacus’ own uncertainty about the poet’s problems is even more jarring. Crucially, he does not argue that the poet should abandon his profession so that he can pursue God’s plan for him. The poet is a poet, and must find a way to balance his aesthetic skills with complete dedication to the ultimate Author. But just as in the example of Richard III repeated throughout the text, it is unclear if the poet is “strong” enough to succeed in spite of his hunchback or instead achieve apotheosis by confessing the limitations of being all-too-human. Kierkegaard himself knows he has been authored as a poet, but he is unhealthily aware both of the poet’s responsibility for his own authorship, as well as the requisite-yet-murky need to attribute his poetic successes to God’s influence. In fact, this exact statement opens The Point of View: “one thing absorbs me unconditionally. . . to express as honestly and as strongly as possible. . . how infinitely more Governance has done for me than I had ever expected.” To have been authored in order to engage in a career whose substance is a miniature perversion of Governance itself is of course a paradox that all aesthetes must confront. However, the statement of this question without resolution sacrifices a communicable philosophical program in favor of expressing Kierkegaard’s own specific neuroses.

I therefore conclude that the reliance of The Point of View on the argumentative persuasion of the pseudonymous authorship is unfounded, as the published pseudonymous works at the beginning and end of Kierkegaard’s productivity present deeply muddled and radically different pictures of the relationship between the categories of the aesthetic and the religious. Kierkegaard’s authorship does not display a coherent, positive definition of self-identity, however much his works share the same the-
matic fixations: living poetically, tragic love, and religious reconciliation. Yet these themes are salient for understanding what deep unity there is in Kierkegaard’s writing, and I believe it is more likely a result of the biographical events and decisions in Kierkegaard’s life, rather than a predetermined and fully consistent dialectical writing structure, which fueled his creative energy in producing the pseudonyms, torn as they are (and as he was) between aesthetic and religious approaches to emotional pain.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue this claim, I believe Kierkegaard biographer Joakim Garff has accurately described the simultaneously subconscious and ubiquitous placement of biographical details in the authorship:

... And even though Regine [Olsen, Kierkegaard’s fiancée] is not named one single time in the whole of Kierkegaard’s published works, she is intertwined with it like an erotic arabesque, full of longing, sometimes confronting the reader when one least expects it.19

To author oneself, however religiously, is ultimately indistinguishable from describing oneself, with all the requisite contradictions and unresolved psychology entailed in such a massive undertaking. And Kierkegaard, writing himself to death in pursuit of that ephemeral reconciliation between the poetic and religious modes of being, laid it all out for us to see. Here we see why, even as the authorship moved beyond the aesthetic and the ethical to the exclusively religious, the poet hangs on for dear life as the easy way out, the tempting reconciliation with the world that Kierkegaard so desperately craved. Our discovery, therefore, is not that his authorship is in any way confusing or lacking unto itself, but rather that the wonderful castles of Kierkegaard’s thought often sagged under the weight of his highly personal, and tragic, interest in quickly resolving these problems of selfhood.

Notes
2 Ibid, 306.
3 Ibid, 312.
4 Ibid, 313.
5 K. Brian Söderquist, "Telling Stories", Copenhagen, Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, 8.
7 Ibid, 20.
8 Ibid, 25-6.
9 Ibid, 33.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, 253.
14 E/O 251-2.
15 SUD 105.
16 Ibid, 109-10.
18 POV 12.

Works Cited

