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## Three Criticisms of Schopenhauer and a Response from the *Advaita Vedantins*

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Judging by the amount of scholarly literature dedicated to each, Schopenhauer is considered less important than Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. The majority of secondary literature either focuses on his relation to a more prominent figure or criticizes his system for not being internally harmonious. In this paper I intend to examine three critiques of Schopenhauer's philosophy, each of which claims that his philosophy is not internally consistent. Throughout this paper I will refer to the three problems as the knowledge problem, the nihilism problem, and the incoherency problem. While examining these critiques, I will use Indic philosophy to help revive Schopenhauer's system. All three of these critiques are in some way related to Schopenhauer's aesthetic contemplation, and within Indic thought an analogue is found in meditation. Throughout this paper, these two types of meditation will be used as a reference point.

Before addressing the knowledge problem, a preliminary note is needed. Indic philosophy is almost as diverse as the

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western philosophical tradition. When I speak of Indic philosophy, I will be referring to the school known as *Advaita Vedanta*, or non-dualist Vedanta. Vedanta is one of the six orthodox schools in ancient Indic philosophy,<sup>1</sup> and advaita is one of its sects.<sup>2</sup> Among these schools there circulated a standard body of texts,<sup>3</sup> some of which were more closely associated with one school than with others. For instance, a book like the Yoga Sutras was closely tied to the Yoga school, yet all of the schools used and developed a commentarial tradition on the text. Thus, when I speak of an Indic concept my point of view will be that of the non-dualist Vedantins. The tenets of this school will become clear throughout this paper, although it should be remembered that my goal here is not to elucidate the similarities or differences between Schopenhauer and Vedanta. The task at hand is to use Vedanta to help ward off the attacks made against Schopenhauer.

The first problem I call “the knowledge problem.” Before I begin examining the problem, it will be useful to discuss Schopenhauer’s view of knowledge. The groundwork for Schopenhauer’s epistemology was laid by Kant. Thus for Schopenhauer, space and time are merely intuitions of the mind, while causality is one of the manifestations of the principle of sufficient reason.<sup>4</sup> This principle states that any representation can be explained by reference to a separate or preceding representation, just as classical physics tells us. As a result of this, reason and all of its concepts are valid only in relation to experience, which necessarily takes place in space and time. Except for a special experience called “aesthetic contemplation,” everything in the phenomenal world is guided by principle of sufficient reason, which for our purposes is simply causality. The principle of sufficient reason is completely deterministic. It holds necessarily and absolutely determines the way in which the world changes.

Aesthetic contemplation is an experience during which we gaze not just on an object, but upon its Form or Idea understood in the Platonic sense. Schopenhauer calls the Platonic Ideas the adequate objectification of the will.<sup>5</sup> As such, they are the intermediary between the fluctuating world of sense-perception and

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from the will by virtue of being differentiated from each other. As a result of this, the objects of aesthetic contemplation are different from the objects of everyday sense-perception and require a different mode of epistemological access. Schopenhauer says, "if the Ideas are to become [the] object of knowledge, this can happen only by abolishing individuality in the knowing subject."<sup>7</sup> In other words, a corresponding change--- — from individuated to non-individuated — must be found in both subject and object if the latter is to be known by the former.

Keeping that preface in mind, we can now state the knowledge problem: How can a human being, whose brain and perceptive faculties fall under the principle of sufficient reason, grasp the Platonic Forms, which do not fall under the principle of sufficient reason? While introducing the will as the thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer says, "besides the will and the representation there is absolutely nothing known or conceivable to us."<sup>8</sup> The Platonic Ideas lie in a vague area that is still representation, yet they lie closer to the will than sense-perception. In some way, then, there must be a continuum from the most concentrated and unwavering aesthetic experience of a Platonic Idea to the most etiologically and causally focused awareness of a particular object. Perhaps, if we can find a correlating continuum of states from the side of the subject, we can dissolve the knowledge problem by saying that aesthetic contemplation lies on one extreme of the epistemological spectrum. Schopenhauer does indeed give us such a description. He says, "our consciousness has two sides; in part it is consciousness of *our own selves*, which is *will*, and in part consciousness of *other things*."<sup>9</sup> He also says that, "apprehension of the Idea. . . springs only from a temporary preponderance of the intellect over the Will, or, physiologically considered, from a strong excitation of the brain's perceptive activity, without any excitation of inclinations or emotions."<sup>10</sup> It should be kept in mind here that each person's body is simultaneously will and representation of will.<sup>11</sup> We can now see the corresponding continuum from both the sides of object and subject. When we are contemplating a Platonic Form, our consciousness is focused exclusively on the object of perception and not on

the object's relation to our will. When we are on the other side of the epistemological extreme we are focused on causality insofar as it will help us satisfy a desire. For instance, I can stare at a soda machine and look at it in two different ways. I can contemplate the properties of plasticity, electricity, and gravity in an attempt to understand the nature of the things I see, or I can focus on the causal mechanisms which will result in me obtaining a soda (feeding in a quarter, pushing the button, electrical pulses being sent to the mechanism which drops the soda out of the slot, etc). According to this explanation, de-individuated knowledge comes about when we reside on one extreme of the continuum.<sup>12</sup>

This answer does not seem completely satisfactory. First, the principle of sufficient reason does not lie on a continuum. It either applies or it does not. Secondly, the innermost nature of all things is will. Where intellect or knowledge appears, it appears as a servant to the will.<sup>13</sup> Even when the intellect has a "temporary preponderance" over the will, as is the case during aesthetic contemplation, the will is still there. It seems questionable to cite the brain's activity as the means by which we forget our will. By doing this, Schopenhauer seems to go against his earlier claim that the body is the will. He says, "the act of the will and the action of the body are not two different states. . . but are one and the same thing. . . This applies to every movement of the body. . . [including] involuntary movement following on mere stimuli."<sup>14</sup> The neurological processes that occur in the brain during perception are an example of "involuntary movement following on mere stimuli." It is unknown how a process falling under the control of the principle of sufficient reason could produce an experience that does not. Schopenhauer says that in humans, the intellect has the unique power to overthrow its master, the will,<sup>15</sup> but he does not explain how this is possible. If the continuum suggested earlier is accurate, then Schopenhauer seemingly cannot account for this phenomenon. Knowledge that falls outside of the principle of sufficient reason should not lie on the continuum; it should be a further leap past the most concentrated and non-causally focused concentration. Because

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knowledge arises out of the will, will-less knowledge seems impossible. For the object to remain while the will vanishes is inconceivable: it is as if one removes the premises and still expects the conclusion.

This problem rises not because contemplative experience is unbelievable, but because Schopenhauer's metaphysics do not logically allow for it. Within the Indic tradition, we see a practice nearly identical to aesthetic contemplation: meditation. These two activities are curiously similar. According to the Yoga Sutras, there are eight "limbs" of yoga.<sup>16</sup> Of these eight limbs or steps, the last four deal with varying stages of meditation. In ascending order, they are: disengagement of the senses, concentration, meditation, and absorption. These four states roughly correspond to the continuum we saw earlier, where one begins by viewing the world as a conglomeration of objects meant to please the senses. The stage in which we disengage the senses is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum where we try to stop desiring. Concentration and meditation may be seen as varying degrees of mental focus. Eventually, one views objects not as possible ways of satisfying the senses, but as objects upon which to meditate. The final stage of meditation, called absorption or *Samadhi*, is further split up into five subcategories. The first two seem to have direct overlap with aesthetic contemplation. According to the first traditional commentator of the Sutras, Vyasa, the first of these stages involves taking up an object with complete focus.<sup>17</sup> Naturally, this would involve not letting one's self desire or want the object upon which one is meditating. The second stage, according to various commentators, is when we see the "subtle elements" of the object previously meditated upon. Within Indic physics, the subtle elements of all material things are called *gunas*. They are the three basic constituents of all material and mental bodies, and also have a quality associated with them. The three *gunas*—*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*—are associated with the qualities of lucidity, activity, and heaviness. The differences in objects that we encounter in the world arise because of differing constituents and different ratios of the *gunas*. The natural disposition of objects to behave in a certain way arises from

the gunal composition of the thing.

We have shown that there exists a parallel between the two types of contemplation. In Schopenhauer's version we see the inner nature of a thing as will; we notice the way in which all things move, desire, or tend to a certain behavior that is natural to its kind. Similarly, when contemplating the gunas or subtle elements of a thing, we are focusing on the three elements of material nature that are responsible for the natures and movements of all things. It is not at all a stretch of the imagination to equate these two contemplative states.<sup>18</sup> The difference is that in the Indic tradition this is not the final stage of contemplation. According to some commentators of the Yoga Sutras,<sup>19</sup> the third stage involves contemplating thoughts and the sense organs themselves, while the fourth stage has the most basic part of the mind as its object.<sup>20</sup> The fifth and final stage is when the soul or *atman* becomes fully aware of itself.

The metaphysical differences between Schopenhauer and the Vedantins have now become evident. Schopenhauer says that the will, which has "striving [as] its sole nature," is the nature of all phenomena.<sup>21</sup> The Vedantins claim that the core of every living being is an atman, which is variously identified as the "ear of the ear; . . . the eye of the eye,"<sup>22</sup> or the "unthought thinker; the unknown knower."<sup>23</sup> In short, the atman is consciousness. All psychical activity, however, is a product of the three gunas, which together are called *prakriti*. But the atman may not be pure consciousness. In the Kena Upanishad we see a student ask his guru, "Willed by whom does the directed mind go towards its object?"<sup>24</sup> The answer to this is the entity which is described as the 'ear of the ear; . . . the eye of the eye.' Although the main power of this atman is consciousness, it is plausible to locate some sort of agency in the atman itself, as the Brahma Sutras do explicitly.<sup>25</sup>

It appears that we may have found a solution to Schopenhauer's knowledge problem. If Schopenhauer were to admit two things, he could solve the knowledge problem. First, if he were to admit that the fundamental part of a sentient being is the foundation of consciousness, he would be able to account for

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knowledge. More specifically, he could account for de-individuated experience, because the knowing entity does not fall under the rule of the principle of sufficient reason. It is immaterial, and according to the Vedantins, it is the same in every conscious being.<sup>26</sup> This gives the inner-most self an ontological status identical to the Platonic forms. It also still allows for normal perception. The brain and body still operate according to the principle of sufficient reason, and normal perception occurs when the atman is conscious of the brain's activity. Schopenhauer can also still maintain that all things, with the exception of the inner-most self, have will or striving as their essence, because this striving and will only manifests itself in the gunas, which are distinct from the atman. An entity that has the fundamental nature of receptivity does not will in the way Schopenhauer claims it does, but all of its gunally composed objects do. Schopenhauer can still maintain that the body is nothing but the will, because the atman is wholly different from the body. All willing and striving does arise from the body, but the body is not the same as our inner-most self. The second thing he must give up is the implicit claim that consciousness arises from the brain. Schopenhauer never talks about the nature of consciousness directly, but he counts it among the powers of the intellect, often using 'consciousness' as a synonym for 'perception' or 'abstract awareness.'<sup>27</sup> If Schopenhauer were to admit that consciousness is different from intellect, he could still maintain that the entire world of representation has the nature of will. Since Schopenhauer is a transcendental idealist, he maintains that the intellect produces matter and, therefore, will.

The second problem is called "the nihilism problem," and it deals with the aim of ethics. Upon having an experience of aesthetic contemplation one sees that the innermost nature of all things is will, and then strives to silence it.<sup>28</sup> In the concluding chapter of the *World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer speaks of "deliverance from a world whose whole existence presented itself to us as suffering."<sup>29</sup> For Schopenhauer, the will is nothing but unsatisfied desire and suffering.<sup>30</sup> Unfortunately, Schopenhauer also says that the "human will is always directed

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to its own well-being, which in sum is comprehended under the concept *happiness*.”<sup>31</sup> If we are to stop suffering, then we must stop the search for happiness. This is a fundamental point in Schopenhauer’s ethics. Schopenhauer uses the phrase “denial of the will-to live,” or “mortification of the will” to refer to this behavior.<sup>32</sup> The problem is that by denying the will-to-live, one denies reality. To phrase this more strongly, one may say that Schopenhauer has as his goal the denial of what is most fundamental and real, in favor of nothingness.<sup>33</sup> Although this is not a logical problem, it is intuitive that denying the foundations of reality is in some way mistaken, although Schopenhauer would claim that our intuitions merely support his theory of the will-to-live.

Foreseeing this objection, Schopenhauer says that the concept of nothingness is essentially relative and dependant on one’s point of view. For instance, when doing arithmetic one can make a negative number positive by adding a second negative sign. This reversal of qualities is possible only because negativity, and by extension the concept of nothingness, are relative concepts. Because nothingness is a relative term, “absolute nothingness” has no meaning. It is an incoherent concept. Human beings are phenomena of the Platonic Form “human.” As such, we are the objectified will-to-live. From our point of view, denying the will “appears . . . as a transition into empty nothingness.”<sup>34</sup> From a different point of view it would appear as the best of all possible transitions. According to Schopenhauer, this transition into nothingness is what superstitious dogmatists variously call “ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and so on.”<sup>35</sup> The problem with this view is that there can be no other point of view than the one we have. The will is the sole existent. The only other fathomable point of view is that of non-existence, and that is by definition not a point of view. If the will is fundamental, as Schopenhauer claims, his ethics necessarily amount to a denial of reality, which always appears to us as something bad.

The Vedantin philosopher will also admit that “[f]or one who has discrimination, everything is suffering.”<sup>36</sup> In this phrase, the word “everything” means “everything physical,” or “everything

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that is prakritic."<sup>37</sup> The equivalent to "prakriti" in Schopenhauer's thought is "representation." The difference is that representation *is* will (the cause of suffering). For the Vedantin, prakriti is the cause of suffering. It is either fundamentally separate from the atman, or connected with it in virtue of being derived from the same source.<sup>38</sup> This is important, because the Vedantins will only admit that all of life is suffering, so long as it is viewed in a certain way. But they will deny that Brahman, the ultimate source of everything, is the cause of suffering. Rather, the cause is misidentifying our true selves with our bodies and minds, which is precisely what Schopenhauer does. It is the nature of prakriti to change, deteriorate, and eventually annihilate everything it brings forth.<sup>39</sup> As Schopenhauer correctly points out, it is the will's essential nature to strive against and consume itself.<sup>40</sup> Like the knowledge problem, Schopenhauer can still hold the belief that the body is the will, but he cannot maintain that the will is the most fundamental nature of our selves. If he were willing to admit that at our core was a conscious being, he could still maintain the transient and painful nature of all representation and not be accused of denying reality. From this new perspective, suffering arises from a misidentification of the body with the self, not from the inner-most nature of reality.<sup>41</sup>

The last problem arises not while looking at the goals of Schopenhauer's ethics, but while examining the feasibility of putting them into practice. I call this "the incoherency problem," and it relates to "the nihilism problem" in that it is an attempt to carry out the actions learned from contemplation. The issue is whether it is possible to silence the will without willing in the process.<sup>42</sup> In describing ethics and ethical living, Schopenhauer presents a three tiered account: the first and second are found in the essay *On the basis of Morals*, while the third is in the final chapter of *The World as Will*. The first stage of ethical action is negative, while the second is positive. In the negative account Schopenhauer describes the virtue of justice. Justice is that which "steps before me, checking the inherent anti-moral powers in me, as a result of which I cause others to suffer, calling me to 'stop!'"<sup>43</sup> The second stage, which is positive, is called loving

kindness. Schopenhauer says that loving kindness “does not just restrain me from hurting another, but even impels me to help him.”<sup>44</sup> These virtues both arise out of compassion, which is the immediate identification of, and participation in, another’s suffering.<sup>45</sup> The third step is again negative, and one no longer acts out of compassion or virtue. In *The World as Will*, Schopenhauer says that when a person “recognizes the true nature of things-in-themselves, and thus the whole, [he] is no longer susceptible [to] such consolation. . . . The phenomenon by which this becomes manifest is the transition from virtue to *asceticism*.”<sup>46</sup> The ascetic is the human who “ceases to will anything.”<sup>47</sup>

At this point we may ask whether this view is logically consistent. Every action and movement of the body is an action of the will. This must be the case with the lack of action as well. To examine this more closely we may enquire into suicide, of which Schopenhauer often speaks.<sup>48</sup> Generally, Schopenhauer is against suicide. He says that it is a misguided attempt to silence the will that ultimately fails. Suicide is a manifestation of the dissatisfaction with one’s particular condition, and not with life itself.<sup>49</sup> There is a special type of suicide, however, that is the utmost extreme of asceticism: starvation.<sup>50</sup> All other suicides attempt to eliminate suffering by cutting life short. In this case however, the suffering is prolonged, and the will does not affirm itself by eliminating the pain involved in life. The difference between these two situations seems harder to distinguish than Schopenhauer supposes. If an action takes severe discipline or if the results are painful, then it is an act of the will to refrain from responding. It could not be otherwise. If it were, we might ask, what is causing you to not will? The will causes one to not will, or as Nietzsche puts it, to will nothingness. At this point, Schopenhauer might object that to cease acting is to cease willing: The body is the will, but only its movements are willed. You do not will yourself to stay motionless during a deep sleep, he might say. To this one could respond by pointing to pleasure and pain. It is true that our bodies can be at rest without it being willed. An ascetic’s body, however, incurs great hardship and pain. According to Schopenhauer, “it is called pain when it is contrary to

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the will."<sup>51</sup> It is our own will that prevents us from acting out against this pain. We can see this from the nature of will itself. When explaining the way in which the Forms take hold of matter, Schopenhauer states that higher and more complex Forms do not exterminate the lower, but appropriate them. For example, the human Form appropriates crystallization in bone formation, electricity in the brain, and chemical separation in the stomach. He makes it clear that the higher are not epiphenomena reducible to the lower; but the higher, "swallowing up all of them," appropriate the lower, for "variance with itself [is] essential to the will . . . each wishes to reveal its own Idea."<sup>52</sup> The will's essential nature is to strive against itself, as Schopenhauer puts it, "the will-to-live generally feasts on itself."<sup>53</sup> Thus, we must admit that the inner struggle one feels as an ascetic is a perfect mirroring of the will's essential nature which was supposed to be eliminated through asceticism.

To solve this problem, one must remember a distinction that was suggested when examining the knowledge problem. According to the Brahma Sutras and the Kena Upanishad, the atman has some sort of agency. This agency must be sharply distinguished from want or desire. Although this issue has not been developed well within the Indic tradition,<sup>54</sup> there are some problems with attributing agency purely to the mind. If the mind is the thing that works for liberation, then it is the thing liberated. The atman was never deluded in the first place, and enlightenment has nothing to do with the atman. In this case the atman would be the eternally "detached witness"<sup>55</sup> that passively watches the mind free itself of ignorance. A similar argument states that if the body had agency within it, the atman would again be stuck as a passive witness to a body which freed itself by its own agency.

If Schopenhauer were to accept that will lies in the body and in the material universe, but that the inner-most self retains some amount of agency, he would not have the incoherency problem. If the self has agency, then self-denial is not the contradictory self-reflexivity it appears to be for Schopenhauer. Instead, it is a hierarchical ordering that is initiated by the inner-most self. In this

situation Schopenhauer could retain his beliefs about the freedom of the will and the deterministic nature of the material world. The self, which has agency, is totally free to make decisions. All motives and influences, however, are bound up with the deterministically bound body. Only when a person has encountered certain ideas and experiences will that person be capable of choosing the path of philosophical enlightenment, or for that matter, any other path. This seems to be what we encounter in the world. It takes a certain disposition and set of experiences to embrace any particular life.

To conclude, I will summarize the solutions and amendments which I recommend Schopenhauer accept if he is to avoid the aforementioned problems. If Schopenhauer accepts the following propositions, he will not run into the problems he does: 1) The inner-most self has consciousness. 2) Consciousness is different, and more fundamental than, the intellect. 3) The self has a type of basic agency which is different from wants and desires. By accepting these three propositions, Schopenhauer can maintain a whole host of his beliefs which include, but are not limited to: atheism, the priority of first hand experience in metaphysics, the painful and transient nature of the material world, the freedom of self, the determinacy of the world, the legitimacy and reality of aesthetic contemplation, and finally the mystical belief in the one-ness of all beings. It is my belief that with these changes, the essential characteristics of Schopenhauer's philosophy are still preserved. Among modern philosophers, Schopenhauer is the black sheep of the flock. His metaphysical system has more in common with the ancients than any does any other system from the modern period. As has been demonstrated, Schopenhauer can retain many of his essential beliefs even after these changes. Although this paper is not the place to do so, it seems appropriate that the next step for an admirer of Schopenhauer would be to look into Schopenhauer's influences. By doing this one could determine the specific beliefs and concepts which lead Schopenhauer into holding problematic doctrines.<sup>56</sup> The natural place to look would be in Kant, whose books greatly influenced Schopenhauer's views on consciousness and intellect. By exam-

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ining these three problems and suggesting further work to be done, I have hoped to contribute not only to the legitimacy of Schopenhauer as a philosopher; but also to the Vedanta tradition which, though quite similar to many western philosophies, is often not studied by western philosophers. Schopenhauer and the Vedantins both have many merits which are often overlooked. By conducting research into these two philosophical systems I am attempting to display the merits and spread awareness of both as relevant and important schools of thought.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> The other schools are Vaishesika, Nyaya, Yoga, Sankhya, and Mimamsa.

<sup>2</sup> The two other competitive sects were *dvaita* (dualism), and *vishishtadvaita* (qualified non-dualism).

<sup>3</sup> Some of the standard texts are the Vedas, the Upanishads, The Bhagavad Gita, the Yoga Sutras, the Brahma Sutras, as well as many others that are lesser known.

<sup>4</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (LaSalle: Open Court, 1974) 52-57. While the manifestation spoken of here deals with changes in matter, the other three deal with true and false judgments, mathematics, and animal motivation. Human action is specifically determined by motivations and reasons, not physical causality.

<sup>5</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1* (Mineola: Dover, 1969) 178-181

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 127-130.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 169.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>9</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2* (Mineola: Dover, 1969) 367.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 367.

<sup>11</sup> Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1, 99-103; "The whole body must be nothing but my will become visible, must be my will itself." 107.

<sup>12</sup> Everyday awareness seems to lie somewhere between the two extremes, although nearer the side of the will than the intellect. The absolute egoist would have the other extreme state of perception, because he would be interested in things only insofar as they did something for him.

<sup>13</sup> Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1, 177.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 184-194; This is what the genius and the madman have in common, namely to perceive things apart from their cause, effects, or relations.

<sup>16</sup> Patanjali, *The Yoga Sutras*, trans. Edwin F. Bryant (New York: North Point Press, 2009) II.29.

<sup>17</sup> Patanjali, *Yoga Sutras*, I.17

<sup>18</sup> Swami Vivekananda, who was a contemporary and friend of Schopenhauer, says "when one struggles to take the elements out of time and space, and think them as they are, it is called Nirvitarika, [the second stage of Samadhi]." Swami Vivekananda, *Raja Yoga* (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 2007) 132. In this passage we see a stage of Samadhi described in explicitly Kantian/Schopenhauerian terms, illustrating that they are analogous, if not identical.

<sup>19</sup> Patanjali, *Yoga Sutras*, I.17. In particular, Vacaspati Misra.

<sup>20</sup> Different commentators name different parts of the *Citta* as the most basic. Most of them agree that it is that most basic part which is meditated upon in this stage of Samadhi.

<sup>21</sup> Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1, 308

<sup>22</sup> Swami Gambhirananda, trans. *Eight Upanishads Volume 1*. (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 2008) 42

<sup>23</sup> Eliot Deutsch and Rohit Dalvi, editors. *Essential Vedanta: A New Source Book of Advaita Vedanta*. (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2004) 45

<sup>24</sup> Gambhirananda, *Eight Upanishads Vol. 1*, 40

<sup>25</sup> Swami Gambhirananda, trans. *Brahma-Sutra-Bhasya of Sri Sankaracarya*. (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 2000) II.iii.33-39

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<sup>26</sup> The only reason we seem separated is because of Maya, or illusion, which often functions in a way similar to the principle of sufficient reason, the cause of individuality for Schopenhauer.

<sup>27</sup> Schopenhauer, *WWR* Vol. 1. 119. Here Schopenhauer says that time and space are present in consciousness, showing that he uses “consciousness” and “intellect” interchangeably among other words.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 397, “complete resignation or holiness, always proceeds from that quieter of the will; and this is the knowledge of [the will].

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 409.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 164, “the will in itself ... is an endless striving.” 196 “All willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering.”

<sup>31</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (Oxford: New York, 2010) 130.

<sup>32</sup> Schopenhauer, *WWR* Vol. 1. 378-398. Both of these phrases are used and explained in this chapter.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 411, “Before us there is certainly left only nothing.”

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 409

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 410.

<sup>36</sup> Patanjali, *Yoga Sutras*, II.15.

<sup>37</sup> Prakriti is synonymous with the interaction or play of the gunas. The gunas are analogous to something like atoms, while prakriti is material nature in general.

<sup>38</sup> The Vedantins maintain the oneness of all things. They will either say that prakriti is the lower nature of Brahman, as is the case in the Bhagavad-Gita, or they will say that prakriti is the power of Maya used by Brahman. In either case the relationship between atman and prakriti is fundamentally different from that of the individual will and the fundamental will.

<sup>39</sup> Patanjali, *Yoga Sutras*, II.15.

<sup>40</sup> Schopenhauer, *WWR* Vol. 1, 146-147.

<sup>41</sup> It should be noted here that the method for fixing this mistaken identity is any one of the paths of yoga, which include *raja*, or meditation yoga; *Karma*, or action yoga; and *Bhakti*, or devotional yoga (which is not discussed in this paper).

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<sup>42</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, trans. Maudemaire Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998) 118, “man would much rather will *nothingness* than not will...”

<sup>43</sup> Schopenhauer, *The Two Fundamental Problems*, 217.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 229.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 212-213.

<sup>46</sup> Schopenhauer, *WWR* Vol. 1. 380.

<sup>47</sup> Schopenhauer, *WWR* Vol. 1. 380.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 398-402; Schopenhauer, *The Two Fundamental Problems*, 142-142.

<sup>49</sup> Schopenhauer, *WWR* Vol. 1. 398-399.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 400-402.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 146-147.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.

<sup>54</sup> Patanjali, *Yoga Sutras*, 462-466.

<sup>55</sup> Patanjali, *Yoga Sutras*. 466.

<sup>56</sup> Mark Anderson, *Pure: Modernity, Philosophy, and the One* (San Rafael: Sophia Perennis,

2009) 54-63; This is done from a Platonist perspective. This chapter deals largely with Schopenhauer and seeks to critique him from the point of view of Plotinus, in a similar manner that I have done in this paper. Although the point of reference is different, the spirit of the book *Pure* is one that is largely taken up here, and in that respect I am indebted to it.

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