

Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence as a Psychological Test of Action

Micah Dugas

I. INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of the eternal recurrence played a central role in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. While the doctrine's centrality is indisputable, its function has been debated. It has been interpreted variously as a traditional piece of metaphysics on the one hand, and as a psychological test of the will's commitment to a given action on the other. In this paper, I undertake an exposition of the role of the eternal recurrence in relation to certain key features of Nietzsche's philosophy, such as the Overman and the will to power. I will argue that the psychological test interpretation is to be preferred above the metaphysical interpretation. While the metaphysical interpretation fails to harmonize with key features of Nietzsche's philosophy, the psychological test interpretation harmonizes far better with them. The metaphysical interpretation is to be rejected because i) it fails to act as the "heaviest burden" that Nietzsche so heavily emphasizes, ii) its ultimately deterministic undertones are inconsistent with Nietzsche's insistence on the freedom of the will, and iii) its identification with a natural law is incompatible with Nietzsche's many rejections of laws, both natural and moral. Finally, it shall be argued that we must understand the psychological test interpretation as applying only to the Overman. The doctrine is inapplicable to any

Micah Dugas was born in Lafayette, Louisiana, where he attended school at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette. He graduated with his B.A. in philosophy in May 2007, and will begin a Ph.D. program in philosophy at the University of Miami starting this fall. He has broad interests that include the history of philosophy, epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of language.

other audience, and many objections to Nietzsche's thought can be avoided by taking this point into account.

II. REVALUATION OF VALUES

In *The Joyful Wisdom* 341 we find the first mention in Nietzsche's published works of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence: "If that thought [of the eternal recurrence] acquired power over you as you are, it would transform you, and perhaps crush you; the question with regard to all and everything: 'Do you want this once more, and also for innumerable times?' would lie as the heaviest burden upon your activity." But before we can appreciate the importance of this idea it is necessary to understand that Nietzsche saw the eternal recurrence as a replacement for traditional morality. He felt the need to push down what was already crumbling, to question the grounds of traditional morality, to "shatter the old law-tables."¹ Throughout his works, Nietzsche offers a very powerful critique of nineteenth-century European morality, and it is only after we understand his critique and what he perceived as the inevitable collapse of traditional morality that we can understand how the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is intended to fill the resulting vacuum.

Nietzsche sought to overthrow traditional morality for several reasons. One primary reason concerned the question of God's existence. Certainly a large part of traditional, i.e., Judeo-Christian, morality is tightly tied to theism. This connection can best be seen in the Decalogue. Our views of morality are often inseparably linked to a divine command. However, against this view of morality Nietzsche makes the famous claim through the mouth of a madman,² and later through the mouth of Zarathustra, that "God is dead."³

To Nietzsche, the implications of this statement are terribly unsettling, and he was far from finding in this a cause for rejoicing. He referred to the collapse of traditional morality as a "lengthy, vast and uninterrupted process of crumbling, destruction, ruin and overthrow which is now imminent."⁴ For Nietzsche, to say that God is dead is not to say that a god who once existed has died – as in Christianity – but to say that the

very idea of God is no longer worthy of belief. The idea of God has died. Christ now merits no more belief than a Zeus or an Odin. All figures are equally myths, who have passed away. But beyond this, in a broader sense it means that the whole idea of an otherworldly realm, of a Kantian noumenon, of anything beyond this earthly existence, has also become unworthy of belief.⁵ Somewhat parenthetically, it can here be objected that the moral ruin that Nietzsche feared is not a logical consequence of the death of God unless one subscribes to the Divine Command Theory of morality. According to this view, the existence of moral truths is dependent upon the existence of God, a point that is controversial and almost univocally rejected. Whether Nietzsche himself accepted the Divine Command Theory may not be completely clear, but at the very least his fears do seem to be justified in light of the fact that the better part of humanity does subscribe to the Divine Command Theory, and may very likely believe nihilism to be the logical corollary of atheism.

Although Nietzsche accepted the nonexistence of God, he was still uncomfortable with the many detrimental beliefs that are tied to this moribund idea in the popular imagination. Firstly, tied to this notion of God, mankind holds almost universally to belief in personal immortality, the belief in an afterlife. Nietzsche vehemently attacked this belief because he considered it an escape from this world into an otherworldly realm that does not exist. Rather than living this life here and now in the fullest overflow of joy and power, one negates this world in a spirit of weakness and looks for a beyond. But since there is nothing beyond this life, the desire for an afterlife is essentially a desire for nothingness. Thus, Nietzsche accuses his religious and philosophical contemporaries of being nihilists and “world calumniators.” The belief in immortality “destroys all rationality, all naturalness of instinct – all that is salutary, all that is life-furthering.”⁶

Another dangerous belief that is popularly thought to emanate from the idea of God as lawgiver is the notion of a static reality, i.e. laws, both moral and physical. Moral laws are created by society in order to preserve the weak. But the fixed nature of these laws is at odds with the nature of reality, which Nietzsche

tells us is essentially one of Heraclitean becoming. Things constantly change in a continuous flux, and to impose static rules upon humanity and nature is to deny the fact that reality constantly changes. "They will not learn that man has become. . . [that] everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths."⁷ Nietzsche thus radically denies the existence of a rational and moral world order.

Although Nietzsche recognizes the tenuous position in which the death of God leaves humanity, it would be a mistake to think that he believed the situation to be hopeless. Quite to the contrary, he tried to separate his own position as far as possible from those perceived nihilists whom he was attacking, e.g., Schopenhauer. His position is ultimately very optimistic. With the death of God, mankind is free of all moral constraints. The horizon is finally open for him to set out upon his own sea, to create his own values, to bring forth a new dawn.⁸ And the new dawn will usher in a new kind of man. In place of God and the weak Christian type of human, Nietzsche gives us the Overman.⁹

The Overman, the individual possessing the strongest will to power, creates his own values and does not allow them to be vulgarized by the consensus of the masses, whom Nietzsche contemptuously branded as the "herd." But the sort of willpower that the Overman wields is first and foremost power over himself. Nietzsche is very clear that the struggle and overcoming in which the Overman engages is, above all, self-overcoming. This point will be discussed more fully later.

Thus it can be seen that the collapse of traditional morality gives a few exceptional people the opportunity to exercise their creative potential in determining what is right for them as individuals. And here it should be noted that, for Nietzsche, the denial of objective value absolutely does not entail the denial of all value. Value of all varieties, and not merely moral value, remains as that which the Overman must create as the personal expression of his will to power.

So, in his process of substitution thus far, Nietzsche has given us the Overman in place of God, and the earth in place of

heaven. Finally, as we shall now see, he has given us the eternal recurrence in place of immortality.

III. THE METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION

As already mentioned, the eternal recurrence can be interpreted as either a metaphysical doctrine, or as a psychological test, with cogent reasons for both views. Having discussed Nietzsche's reevaluation of values, we shall now discuss the metaphysical interpretation. The metaphysical interpretation is the view that an infinite number of cycles of identical repetition actually take place in the universe. Among other passages, the metaphysical interpretation seems to find support from certain statements in *The Will to Power*:

In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated.¹⁰

This passage seems to indicate that here Nietzsche is thinking of the eternal recurrence as something that is part of the objective structure of the universe, something like a law of nature.

With regard to human existence, the implication of this view is that each of us has already lived this exact life an infinite number of times in the past, and will continue to live it an infinite number of times in the future. As Nietzsche states in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*:

Now I die and decay . . . But the complex of causes in which I am entangled will recur--it will create me again!... I shall return eternally to this identical and self-same life, in the greatest things and in the smallest, to teach once more the eternal recurrence of all things.¹¹

Firstly, in support of the metaphysical interpretation, it should be mentioned that Nietzsche did consider undertaking a more extensive study of the physical sciences to try to find support for this theory. However, Nietzsche himself may have taken a somewhat equivocal position on this matter. Our goal is not to find which interpretation is true, or even which Nietzsche believed to be true, but rather to find which interpretation better harmonizes with the body of his philosophical writings. With that said, we shall turn to a critique of the metaphysical interpretation.

While the above passages do seem to lend a certain measure of plausibility to the metaphysical interpretation, several problems with this view quickly arise. Firstly, this interpretation conflicts with Nietzsche's conception of the eternal recurrence as the "greatest burden." And it does this specifically with regard to memory and suffering. Supposing that the metaphysical interpretation is the proper one, we are at an almost complete loss to make sense of Nietzsche's reasons for describing the eternal recurrence in these terms. Presumably, Nietzsche is telling us that the idea of a lifetime's worth of pain and anguish eternally returning could crush us with despair. With this anguish in mind, we are supposed to exercise our will carefully in making choices that would not lead us into eternal regret.

But this attempt to make sense of the eternal recurrence as the greatest burden rests upon a deep misconception. According to Nietzsche, the life to which we return is not a similar life. It is *exactly* the same, down to the smallest details. But then it would follow that in order for the events of one's present life to be identical to the events of one's previous life, there can be no memory of the previous life. Because one does not have any memory of one's past recurrences, neither will one have any memory in a future recurrence. This is to say that there is no "continuity of consciousness" between the cycles of existence.¹² Hence, there cannot be any accumulation of suffering throughout eternity because one cannot remember what one has already suffered in the previous cycles. Nietzsche thinks that we can be guided by the consideration of whether or not we can will something eternally.

However, in identical repetition, it takes no more courage to will something once than it does to will it infinitely.¹³

In this respect, the question of whether or not we could will to repeat something eternally would be a point of complete indifference to us. After we have suffered all that we will suffer in this life, that amount, although terrible, cannot increase by any memory of past suffering or dread of future suffering. All pain in our future recurrence is beyond the range of our present consciousness, thereby making us unable to experience it as we experience fear of pain later in *this* life. It is "only by inappropriately construing the suffering of some future recurrence on the model of suffering later in this life [that] the question of the eternal recurrence of one's pain weigh[s] upon one with 'the greatest stress.'" ¹⁴

Thus, the metaphysical interpretation of the eternal recurrence would seem to be problematic as a guide for one's will, since there can be no accumulation of pain to help one avoid unwanted choices. Presumably, it is pain or regret of some form that lies upon us as "the greatest burden," that gives us good reasons to consider our actions very carefully. However, if pain cannot increase beyond this life, then we cannot suffer anything worse than what we would suffer without identical repetition. The metaphysical doctrine seems to make Nietzsche's "greatest burden" less burdensome.

A second problem with the metaphysical interpretation concerns what appear to be the deterministic undertones of the doctrine. It is a point of contention as to whether such a view poses a serious difficulty for free will. As stated in the passage from *The Will to Power* quoted above, Nietzsche says that between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations *must* take place. A literal understanding of the eternal recurrence places the strongest kind of necessity upon all of the material world, human existence included.

On this view, our choices acquire less weight, since we are not really free to make them. We are caught within a nexus of possible combinations that demand actualization. Any choice that one makes, since that choice would be the result of a possi-

ble combination, would have to take place. If our choices are determined by a previous state of the world, and if these choices must conform exactly to the choices of an infinite number of previous cycles, then we are not free to make those choices. The question of whether we could will something eternally would be completely irrelevant for us, since we would be eternally committed to it anyway. Further, asking ourselves the question at all seems to be an attempt to surreptitiously slip in the thought that we are in a first cycle, that we are in possession of a *tabula rasa* with regard to our actions. But in infinite time there can be no first cycle, and hence no first choice. There is always already an infinite number of cycles behind us.

Perhaps the most ironic thing about this rather unpalatable conclusion is that such determinism seems to be at odds with Nietzsche's numerous attempts to help us place the deepest significance upon our choices, and with his many passages discussing the freedom of the will. And it is because of these "fatalistic overtones" that Schacht considers a metaphysical interpretation to be "one of Nietzsche's thought-experiments which fails."¹⁵

A final problem with the metaphysical interpretation is that it may also be objected that interpreting the eternal recurrence as an objective statement of how nature operates would place a glaring inconsistency in Nietzsche's philosophy. He scrupulously avoids attempting to give insight into the nature of the world as it actually is — the thing-in-itself — and he despised philosophers and scientists who attempted this. In *The Joyful Wisdom*, he tells us that we ought to "beware of saying there are laws in nature."¹⁶ Where scientists think that they are truly explaining things, in reality they are only describing things better than those in previous ages have done.¹⁷

So, to think that Nietzsche intended the eternal recurrence to function as a law of nature is to place him at the receiving end of his own fierce criticisms. Just like every other attempt at formulating natural law that he objects to, such a scientific position would attempt to fix the nature of reality, which Nietzsche has already told us is one of change and flux. This is certainly not the most charitable interpretation of Nietzsche's work. In con-

clusion, the metaphysical interpretation simply does not work. It fails to harmonize with the key features of Nietzsche's thought. However, this failure of the metaphysical doctrine does not detract from the doctrine's usefulness as a psychological test.¹⁸ Of course, it is clearly not the case that the failure of the metaphysical interpretation entails the success of the psychological test interpretation. The latter must be judged on its own merit.

IV. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST INTERPRETATION

To view the eternal recurrence as a kind of decision-making procedure for the will presents itself as the more plausible interpretation. In the collapse of moral absolutes, the will — which is “beyond good and evil” — has filled the void. Nevertheless, the unbounded will needs some guide to outline what is (for the individual, at least) the preferred course of action. As quoted above, Nietzsche says that we should create our values by asking ourselves whether or not we can will them eternally.¹⁹ Although we will not eternally recur, we ought to choose *as though* we will recur, *as though* we would have to repeat our actions forever. In the words of Kaufmann, we must understand the eternal recurrence “not as a dogma but as a hypothesis.”²⁰ Thus, rather than a scientific theory, the eternal recurrence is meant to act as a practical guide to our actions. If, upon reflection, we decide that we cannot will a particular action forever, then we should probably refrain from it.

When considering the eternal recurrence, it is very important not to confuse it with a moral principle intended to help one to make ethical decisions, since ultimately there are no such things as ethical decisions: “There are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.”²¹ It is certainly not Nietzsche's intention to give any supreme principle of morality. Supreme principles of morality — specifically the categorical imperative, for Nietzsche — are all equally guilty of glossing over the highly individual nature of each particular action. “By means of them [supreme moral principles], indeed, a semblance of equality can be attained, *but only a semblance*,—that in outlook and retrospect *every* action is, and remains, an im-

penetrable affair." ²²

While there have been attempts to compare the eternal recurrence to the categorical imperative, these are ultimately very misguided. A person who chooses his or her course of action based on whether they could will it for eternity has in mind certain psychological considerations and consequences. However, this is far from Kant's position, which stresses the logical consistency of maxims and places no consideration upon consequences, psychological or otherwise. ²³ The contrast between Nietzsche and Kant is thereby one of consequentialism versus deontology.

Against Kant, Nietzsche calls on us to be the active creators of our own values, to find what judgments are the expressions of *our* will to power, rather than to follow a supreme principle that is often someone else's expression of their will to power. "A virtue has to be *our* invention, *our* most personal defense and necessity: in any other sense it is merely a danger. 'Virtue,' as Kant desired it, is harmful." ²⁴

The eternal recurrence is potentially very powerful as a guide because it forces one to refrain from committing to a given action unless one can support that action with the entire will. Nietzsche would not have us making careless decisions, but rather placing the highest consideration upon each choice. Since this life is the only opportunity that we have, we must act with the fullest measure of strength and freedom here and now. Nietzsche conceived of the eternal recurrence as the greatest illustration of life-affirmation that we can possibly display. It is tightly knit to his idea of *amor fati*, love of one's fate. To be able to eternally will the repetition of our life means "that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity." ²⁵ It means a justification of the world and of our lives with all of our pleasure and pain. Ultimately, it is the ability to love even the suffering of our life that gives life its justification and purpose.

Further, the eternal recurrence does not demand any kind of consistency in what we will, and so what we will in one moment may not be what we will in the next. Changing our mind is perfectly consistent with the idea of creation and becoming. However, this is not to say that choice is arbitrary. As Nietzsche tells

us, the “good” decisions are those that are the expression of power, and the “bad” those that are the expression of weakness. “What is good? – All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad? – All that proceeds from weakness.”²⁶ Thus, while particular expressions of the will to power will undoubtedly vary, the “good” choices are those that proceed from power.

But the generality of our discussion thus far may create some confusion. One potential point of misunderstanding about the eternal recurrence may arise from a failure to realize Nietzsche's audience. To Nietzsche's credit, he was fully aware that the eternal recurrence was not for everyone, and very serious problems arise if one ignores this fact and thinks that he intended it for society. Nothing could be further from the truth, and Nietzsche's works contain numerous attempts to clarify this point. In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche explicitly says, "I never speak to masses."²⁷ Elsewhere, he explains how he has both chosen who his reader is, and who he is not. A writer not only wants to be understood, but he also wants to be misunderstood by those to whom he is not writing.²⁸ Examples could be multiplied, but the fact that Nietzsche deliberately made many of his works unclear to the average reader seems a sufficient indication that he was not writing for everyone, but rather to the strong individual. The very esoteric character of his works forces one to learn to read him very carefully, a mental exertion for which most readers will not have the patience.²⁹

His doctrine presupposes an exceptional individual, one who can create his own values and will them eternally without external help. It is totally inadequate for any other type of person, and is not strong enough for the masses; or perhaps it would be truer to say that the masses are too weak for it. And this is the primary point: The eternal recurrence is fundamentally and inextricably tied to Nietzsche's conception of the Overman. It loses its effectiveness with any other person.

Nietzsche fully recognized that the radical stance of his philosophy, e.g., the denial of objective value, would usher in turmoil. His attempt to correct millennia of lies – his revaluation –

would inevitably lead to unprecedented conflict.³⁰ But lest it be thought that Nietzsche was insensitive to the upheavals that his philosophy was likely to cause, it should be noted that he acknowledged that the task of liberation from convention was a very delicate one. As he says in *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, "only the ennobled man may be given freedom of spirit.... In any other mouth his motto would be dangerous."³¹

The weak individual should absolutely not liberate himself from traditional morality, and Nietzsche had no intention of trying to liberate him. Instead, this person should stay bound. The masses need strong external coercion, e.g., the state, Christianity, etc., to keep them under control. As Nietzsche succinctly tells us in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "he who cannot obey himself will be commanded."³² Freedom should only be given to those who are strong enough for it. To remove all restraints from the masses would be to loose true anarchy upon the world, a form of behavior which Nietzsche detested as much as he did Christianity.³³ When his philosophy is used to advance anarchy or anti-Semitism, we should keep in mind that this was the opposite of his intentions. Nietzsche's comments on such positions are decidedly negative, and only a willful misreading such as that of the Nazis can invite misunderstanding. Those who defend such positions with Nietzsche's philosophy are ignoring Nietzsche's clear condemnations of such views and trying to enjoy the freedom of the destroyer without paying the high price of the creator.

And the creator does pay a high price. Although it may seem as though the creator is wildly free and uninhibited after having cast off all moral restraint, Nietzsche tells us that the very reverse is the case. Behind every action must be the consideration of whether that action can be willed forever. Such a person has to choose here and now, and cannot look for escape in a beyond. Only such an individual truly lives with the full consciousness of her own complete freedom. As the creator of her own laws, she must also be her own judge and punish herself when she violates those laws. And "it is terrible to be alone with the judge and

avenger of one's own law." ³⁴

But here an obvious question may be asked. What happens if the Overman's values conflict with the values of society in such a way that hostility becomes inevitable? This is certainly to be expected at some point. Judging by the emphasis that Nietzsche places upon the ideas of upheaval, chaos, and war, it seems impossible that the Overman can peacefully coexist with society. In his better interests, the Overman may decide to live in solitude, something for which Nietzsche frequently affirms the need, e.g. Zarathustra's residence on a mountaintop as a recluse. However, solitude is for the sake of the Overman rather than for the safety of society, since interaction with the latter may prevent the Overman from fully creating his own values, from achieving the highest exercise of his will to power. Nietzsche tells us that although powerful, the type of human that he is seeking is also very delicate, and has often been destroyed by society. Throughout the ages, he has been a "fortunate accident... never as something willed." ³⁵ Certainly never willed, because his powerful instinctual nature makes him a terrifying creature for society. But the well-being of the masses and the Overman's ability to peacefully coexist with them was not part of Nietzsche's concern.

But we must expand upon this point. If the Overman hurts his neighbor while creating his values, then this cannot be avoided. But, intentionally hurting others is not part of the Overman's character. Rather, any harm done to society during the creation of values is only incidental and is not part of the Overman's deliberate intentions. So, contra many misunderstandings of his thought, "tyranny over others is not part of Nietzsche's vision, though the failure to indulge in it is no virtue unless one has the power to become a tyrant and refrains deliberately." ³⁶ Refusal to enter into tyranny over others is a further expression of the Overman's will to power. And the power that the Overman wields is first and foremost to be understood as power over himself, rather than power over others. In this respect, Nietzsche's conception of the Overman is very similar to Aristotle's view of the noble and virtuous person, and much understanding of Nietzsche can be gained by a comparison to Aris-

total. Neither philosopher is concerned with morality proper, but rather with a person's ability to be noble, disciplined, and self-controlled. Numerous passages in Nietzsche show the powerful influence of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in this respect, Nietzsche's conception of the ideal man is very similar to the classical Greek view of the virtuous man.

To return to our discussion of the Overman's relation to society, Nietzsche never promises that the Overman would help to bring about an orderly society. Indeed, those looking for a system with which to build an orderly society should look elsewhere, because order was never Nietzsche's intention. To attempt to construct an orderly society from Nietzsche's philosophy, we would have to completely overlook passages where he speaks of his Dionysian nature, the nature that "encompasses *joy in destruction*."³⁷ And again he tells us that "the last thing I should promise would be to 'improve' mankind. No new idols are erected by me."³⁸ As Kaufmann has so aptly put it, "For Nietzsche, the Overman does not have instrumental value for the maintenance of society: he is valuable in himself because he embodies the state of being that has the only ultimate value there is; and society is censured insofar as it insists on conformity and impedes his development."³⁹

V. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude our discussion of the psychological test interpretation of the eternal recurrence, we must recognize that it harmonizes with the body of Nietzsche's thought far better than the metaphysical interpretation does. The former ties in with the key motifs of Nietzsche's philosophy such as the Overman, the will to power, and his method of speaking to the individual far more effectively than the metaphysical doctrine can. This ability of the eternal recurrence so interpreted to make Nietzsche's thought coherent seems a persuasive reason to accept it as the more viable interpretation.

NOTES

- ¹ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 214.
- ² Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 125.
- ³ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 2.
- ⁴ Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 343.
- ⁵ On the issue of Nietzsche's critique of Kantian noumena and God, see Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 335.
- ⁶ Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 43.
- ⁷ Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, 2.
- ⁸ Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 343.
- ⁹ I have chosen to follow Kaufmann in translating the German *Übermensch* as *Overman*, rather than its oft-used alternative translation *Superman*, since the former seems to be more in keeping with the German meaning, and with Nietzsche's specific references to self-overcoming. See Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 307.
- ¹⁰ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 1066.
- ¹¹ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 237.
- ¹² Solomon, *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays*, 335.
- ¹³ Hatab, *Nietzsche and the Eternal Recurrence: The Redemption of Time and Becoming*, 113.
- ¹⁴ Solomon, *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays*, 340.
- ¹⁵ Schacht, *Nietzsche*, 265.
- ¹⁶ Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 109.
- ¹⁷ Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 112.
- ¹⁸ Schacht, *Nietzsche*, 266.
- ¹⁹ Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 341.
- ²⁰ Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 332.
- ²¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 108.
- ²² Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 335.
- ²³ Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 322.
- ²⁴ Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 11.
- ²⁵ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 258.
- ²⁶ Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 2.
- ²⁷ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 353.

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- ²⁸ Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 381.
- ²⁹ For other passages in which Nietzsche discusses the deliberate lack of clarity of his works, see *Beyond Good and Evil*, 30, 40, 230, 270, 278, 289, and 290.
- ³⁰ See Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 353.
- ³¹ Nietzsche, *The Wanderer and his Shadow*, 350.
- ³² Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 136.
- ³³ See Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 57.
- ³⁴ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 88.
- ³⁵ Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 3.
- ³⁶ Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 316.
- ³⁷ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 5.
- ³⁸ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 2.
- ³⁹ Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 315.

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