LOST IN THE HORIZON: IRIGARAY’S HEIDEGGER

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I

Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was written to explore the primordial question of Being. His ontology, written to address the question, “What is the being that is Da-sein?” is defined by describing the structure of the being who is able to ask this question. He provides Being’s structure, which is Care, and then determines the unifying location of this being, which is temporality. Heidegger specifies his concern by claiming that “Da-sein no longer understands the most elemental conditions which alone make a positive return to the past possible in the sense of its productive appropriation” (BT 17). His two Divisions account for this task, Division I, accounting for the description of Being (Da-sein) and Division II accounting for the temporalization of Being (Da-sein). Heidegger finishes his ontology by reminding us of our primordial task of finding a pathway towards being that allows us access to the primordial question of Being.

Irigaray claims that the creative and ecstatic unity that is Da-sein is only possible because of the feminine represented as air. As she examines his fundamental ontology, she finds that Heidegger’s foundations re-inscribe images of femininity into a sphere of forgetfulness and concealment, ending in the mourning of the death of the feminine to support a masculine world. Irigaray shows that Heidegger is committed to an ontology of presencing that remains unaware and uncritical of the absence associated with and used to suppress and bastardize the feminine. Irigaray concludes that Heidegger’s quest for authenticity and possibility fails. She claims that his entire ontology, which projects a way of understanding man’s place in/as/through being-in-the-world, must be reconsidered. She claims that this productive

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appropriation of the question of Being asked by Da-sein is another exploitative means by which a masculine economy asserts itself as the active and heroic subject.

Air is automatically trapped in a double bind. It cannot be seen or presenced but always acts as the pathway for others and elements such as water, earth and fire. She claims that all previous philosophical understandings of the cosmos have always represented man in the brightness and usefulness of fire and it is this fire that has distinguished and illuminated the lives of others. However, what philosophy has failed to do is examine air (feminine), as it makes everything possible. Heidegger has forgotten air and its attributes. But Heidegger's "forgetfulness of air" is not just a mere not remembering air and how it is appropriated in the context of philosophical discourse. Rather, Irigaray is drawing specifically upon the Heideggerian notion of forgetfulness. His notion of forgetfulness stems from "a positive, ecstatic mode of having-been; a mode with a character of its own. The ecstasy (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away.... ecstatically closing off what it is backing away from and thus closes itself off too..." (BT312). So, if the feminine is represented in the element of air, which cannot rely on its ability to be seen or heard, then it is forgotten and concealed. But, as Heidegger's own definition states, this concealment is not without repose. If we are in the constant ecstasy of forgetting air, then man has also closed off his own possibility for authentic revelation and the ability to question in an authentic manner.

The very notion of logos presupposes the existence of air, but it must always already be forgotten in order to show presence through vision or speech. Heidegger conceptualizes logos as "...deloun, to make manifest what is being talked about in speech...." (BT28). He then attempts to link the idea of speech as "letting us see something" with the idea of synthesis that allows us to see something in its unity and completeness. Rather, he is trying to show that the possibility of letting things be seen together in a way that "... no longer takes the form of a pure letting-be-seen, but rather in its indicating always has recourse to something else and so
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always lets something be seen as something.... also the possibility of covering up” (BT30). Logos allows us to see things as things and this image has the potentiality of being concealed or unconcealed.

Irigaray claims, “nothing comes into appearance that has not dwelt originally in the natural element (air).... that has not first taken root in an environment that nourished it undisturbed by any gaze.... Shielded from the unveiling of any fixed form” (Mortenson 73). Irigaray’s air gives without limitations and without demonstration, the air which is deploying and being deployed (Irigaray 43). Air is constantly making present life and the ability to have presence, but it can never be presenced or articulated because of its very nature of transparency and fluidity that must be forgotten for logos to play its part in the presencing of man through vision and speech. Irigaray shows that “Being is the original ecstasy, where man exists in permanent representation,” and this is in concordance with Heidegger’s own notion of forgetfulness as an ecstatic activity (Irigaray 43).

According to Irigaray, the only thing that can ever be heard in language is the voice of masculine presencing. In his “Origin on the Work of Art,” Heidegger states quite clearly that “language, by naming things for the first time, first brings Beings to word and appearance” (BW 185). This evokes Irigaray’s concern with logos and its direct relationship with presencing and speech. However, Heidegger continues more affectively, stating “... where there is no language.... there is no openness of beings...” (BW 185). This direct and compelling remark indicates that the later Heidegger is much more explicit about the implicit need for presencing based on articulation which is a direct descendant, if not embodiment of the logos that is articulated in his early work. Addressing this privileging of presencing through the concreteness of language, she embraces air, claiming that it invisibly supports all reproduction of the visible. Still, she reminds us that it is only his voice can be present and heard in air. “It is present where she is in absence and the absence of the Other is revealed only through air — which is always
revealed in access, but without appearance or apparatus — this voice is a porthole for air. But the passageway that exists for his voice is forgotten and is appropriated as logos and the trace of air and fluidity is assimilated into his voice and is forgotten" (Irigaray 48). So language is also directly rooted in the absence of air and is formulated only against a background of forgetfulness.

II

Heidegger's "call of conscience" can also be subject to Irigaray's analysis and actually elaborates her discussion of how air, as silence, is used quite explicitly to formulate the authenticity located in the anticipatory resoluteness of being-towards-death. Heidegger's call of conscience can only be heard if one experiences Anxiety and subsequently flees into the Nothingness. In fact, one of the first descriptions Heidegger offers us is Da-sein "being held out into the nothingness of being, held as a relation" (BT 6). So, in order for us to have the experience that allows for authenticity, we must have the negative experience of being held into the Nothingness, provided only by the call that summons us to examine our possibilities; the call of silence. According to Heidegger, this call must be silent because it is the only kind of call that can forget about the "idle talk" of Das Man (rooted in the traditional language of tradition; logos).

However, this silence only acts as the summons. It is "...named and assigned a place, a statute, a name: established in the system of relation for existence and crossing" by Das Man and is used only as a mechanism that is purely contingent, although always available (Irigaray 114). Even when we hear the call of silence, Heidegger reminds us that is only Da-sein calling back to itself and its own possibilities, constituted through the structure of Da-sein and its temporal location. So, this silence is never able to be comprehended or heard as a present and intelligible voice of another. It is merely a part of the assimilation process which results in the completion of an authentic self that must return to its own face to have an authentic existence. Irigaray argues that this assimilation through air is always out in the open but, as with
language and presencing, it is without voice and so it is doomed to be forgotten as soon as it is deployed. By designating this call as silence and separating it from Das Man, we forget about the existence of air (Otherness) and how it completely shapes both the realm of authentic (and inauthentic) existence by its very absence and ability to never be heard or presenced.

In this process of moving towards authenticity, not only is her absence forgotten, but her difference is assimilated entirely into his voice and his words. He keeps her as silence and Nothingness, as something which can never have a voice, but as something that is originally encountered as different and fearful, as Anxiety. However, as he utilizes her, he assimilates her difference into himself and maintains her as forgotten. So, in the final moment of resoluteness, the decision that Da-sein can and will be called into exploring the possibilities of its own thrownness into a particular location, we have completely forgotten about the silence (air) that makes this possible. The forgetfulness of her in silence becomes essential to move beyond the Nothingness that we are held out into, allowing for resoluteness. Irigaray claims that the very repetition of the return to the Nothingness maintains this forgetfulness. As we are drawn into the Nothingness, nothing ever reflects the Nothingness. Instead we are only involved in the constant utilization and repetition of this use of the Nothingness. It is of importance to note that Heidegger also discusses the nullity that results from the possibility of hearing the call and choosing. One might suggest that one could appropriate air simply as something we could choose or just "recognize" as we emerge from our thrownness into our authenticity. However, nullity results in guiltiness, which resides in the inability to make every choice, inescapably residing in a transcendental always already guilty. This guiltiness conceals, just as logos, the very element that is essential in making a call towards authenticity possible. Irigaray describes the appropriation of air (feminine) in the Nothingness as "a sameness, transparent, where everyone comes into presence in giving and receiving.... everyone in
the reflection of his being” (Irigaray 69). Again, it is imperative that we realize that we only receive this call and are thrown into the Nothingness and Anxiety so we can be called back to our own thrownness that provides the groundless grounding (air) for Da-sein.

In addition, Irigaray discusses the role of the masculine economy in the Heideggarian discussion of being-towards-death. Irigaray claims that everyone gives and returns to him (masculinity) in his death — his proper Being. We are called only into the realization that we are made present by thrownness and the possibilities afforded to us through/by logos. She states, more affectively, that Being remains a residue of logos, while Air as our means and nutrience is completely forgotten (Irigaray 112-3). Irigaray implicitly links the Nothingness and the silence that is forgotten in the call of conscience and the resoluteness that is present in Heidegger's authentic being-towards-death. As Heidegger describes this phenomenon, he describes it terms of finitude and then elaborates on it as part of our existential structure. He asserts that it exists as a certainty; not as a mere option that we can cast aside, but as something that must remain with us at all times without being constantly present. Being-towards-death is revealed as one of Heidegger's final steps toward authenticity; anticipatory resoluteness, which is revealed as we anticipate out being-towards-death in such as way that unconceals our possibilities. This mode of achieving authenticity built upon the absolute forgetfulness of air (feminine) is represented as silence and absence. Irigaray argues that because of this forgetfulness, man is in constant mourning for the actual origin of his authentic possibilities and that Being-towards-death is actually mourning the forgetfulness of air (feminine). His brief encounter in the Nothingness leaves a residue that leads to the eventual mourning of the air that surrounds him in his everydayness, as it makes this everydayness possible. Irigaray discusses how “Being becomes the veil of mourning, as a shade (cover) of absence that deploys and reploys his opening and her assimilation and continues in the serenity of his thought...” (Irigaray 75). In this mourning she (air) becomes a trace and
a mystery. She continues to claim that this mourning that occurs with the forgetfulness of air, while condemning air to absolute isolation, is the only way that air is even maintained without absolute obliteration and destruction. Irigaray claims that air is "... crypted in mourning, retired in his forgetfulness. She is always placed for him in memorial of his own being-there.... always alive in and for death. His origins always enter the opening through a veil..." (Irigaray 101). So, in order for Da-sein to become authentic in anticipatory resoluteness, it must constantly be in the state of mourning the Otherness, known only through absence or the encounter with the Nothingness, and existing only for the possibility of Da-sein to recover itself, assimilating the moment of silence into its own pathways or possibilities.

However, Heidegger finds himself caught in his own hermeneutical circle of understanding which Irigaray labels the "circle of forgetfulness." She elaborates on the forgetfulness present in the circle in a fashion similar to how she discusses silence and Nothingness. She describes man as "turning in an identical circle, he absorbs difference and assimilates the other, he does not articulate the mystery of the difference irreducible to the same" (Irigaray 113). Irigaray elaborates, claiming that "man and the world are reunited in the bewitchment of the circle" (Irigaray 77). Heidegger argues that any understanding of the past is automatically projected by the present, projecting its own future possibilities. Irigaray claims that "they accept forgetfulness in view of the future consequences" (Irigaray 105). The past is automatically shaped by the desires that exist as projections out of the Nothingness, initiating the stages of mourning. But it also conceals the absence and silence that make possible the futural projections that function as our possibilities. This means that "... the development of history occurs because of the permanent reserve of the deployment of the world, of being ..." (Irigaray 123). The historical nature of Da-sein can only exist because of the way the circle is premised on the assimilation of everything into a presencing that occurs because of the logos that forgets air. The circle of understanding that gives man the ability to understand his presence in
the hermeneutical circle. It is her air that supports and provides for man’s illumination of his own ontological structure and temporality.

III

It is important to note that Irigaray makes important references to themes in Heidegger’s later works. She discusses the role of the poet and the artist in lieu of the openness of the hermeneutic circle. Heidegger’s later work gestures towards giving the poet and auteur god-like statuses because of their ability to use and promote mechanisms that unconceal in an authentic way. In his "Origin on the Work of Art," he makes this explicit, claiming that "the origin of something asks about its essence. The question concerning the origin of the work of art asks about its essential source" (BW 149). He discusses how art operates in a cyclical mode, stating that "... we are compelled to follow the circle... to enter upon this path is the strength of thought... not only is the main step from work to art a circle like the step from work to art, but every separate step that we attempt circles in this circle" (BW 150). He immediately links the possibility of the unconcealment of art with that of the unconcealability of the everydayness we encounter as part of the hermeneutic circle, or Irigaray’s "circle of forgetfulness." This link is very important to Irigaray because she proposes that if the circle is maintained by/in/through air, which is always forgotten, then the work of art and the artist must reinforce this circle with their ability to unconceal and participate authentically in this circle. While Heidegger maintains that "poetry is the saying of the concealedness of beings," Irigaray reveals the poet in a different shade (BW 185). She maintains that "... the poet arrives for the maintenance of openness. Renouncing the sea, he casts in anchor in the native land... he consecrates the house of gods..." (Irigaray 104-5). If we are to assume that the guardian of the openness of the circle of forgetfulness and Nothingness is the poet and the artist, then we are to assume that the presencing of the artist does, indeed, work to build the temple for the gods that Heidegger cites in his later work as being "in the brightness of the sun." In a similar fashion,
we are forced to accept Heidegger’s assertion that poetry is “the saying of the world and earth, the saying of the arena,... the place of all nearness and remoteness of the gods” (BW 185). However, we should be cautious of those who create and maintain metaphors of presence and illumination (we will explore the precise implications of their building and brightness later).

IV

Irigaray continues to show how Heidegger fails to resolve the problem of positing Being as substantive in his final discussion of the historical pathways (clearing) of Da-sein. At the end of his Being and Time he states, “We must look for a way to illuminate the fundamental ontological question and follow it” (BT 398). She pursues this statement, and others similar to it, because of Heidegger’s metaphors that focus entirely on the ability to appear and be seen. Irigaray develops her discussion of his metaphors quite early in her critique, discussing how his use of horizon and illumination should not be taken superficially. She provides a provocative narrative that discusses the metaphoric implication of Heidegger’s horizon and illumination.

Irigaray begins her discussion of Heidegger’s horizon by discussing it in terms of a mode of establishing presence, a way of making known that relies on statisticity and placement, discussing how the sun assists in awakening forgetfulness. The sun allows matter to be seen individually, separated and at a distance. But it is the source. It is always hidden in mourning (morning). With light as his source, man enters into the economy and into reserve. He begins to make/ascribe absence to presence (Irigaray 44-5). Later, she remarks in a similar fashion, “The morning, when the sun rises, that is when order is restored. Everything is there and posed in front of him in lumination. Matter, which does not allow that entrance into the Other, is day” (Irigaray 50). The only thing that designates what is placed and how it is placed is the sun, which is bright and heavy. The sun, then, represents his domination through the presencing that must occur when we become locked into a horizon. But Irigaray indicates that
"her being is not in a perceptible horizon. He is always entering through her." Unlike air, which flows through everything and allows for life, the sun shines on everything and makes present. She continues, claiming that "this rising of the sun marks the passage of the Other. When the sun rises, she is always in place..." (Irigaray 44). She states more specifically that because of the sun "... she is held at a distance and her movements are controllable... this is the place she occupies in the world, where she is named and approximated... He is joyful with his mourning (morning)" (Irigaray 40). So Heidegger's discussion of the sun's rising reaffirms Irigaray's discussion of his obsession with presencing through assimilation and domination. She finds that the sun is used as a metaphor for the logocentric origins of Heidegger's ontology. Although the sun and the light attempt to illuminate and reveal her, she still remains air and every attempt at illumination results in a false presence and articulation of her.

So, as we come to understand how man is concretely rooted in his ability to emerge in/from his ability to become present in his location, it is then necessary to look directly at Heidegger's vocabulary when he presents historicity. Heidegger first links historicity and metaphor when he states, "that for more advanced Da-sein day and the presence of sunlight no longer possess an eminent function, because this Da-sein has the advantage of being able to turn the night into day" (BT 381). This turning of night into day represents the extreme ability of the earth to not only illuminate the pathway for itself, but to clear the pathway for history to emerge, to create a "clearing." Heidegger states in his later work, "Upon the earth and in it, historical man grounds his dwelling in the world" (BW 171). So the clearing for historical man must be grounded in the earth, which can illuminate itself and even have the possibility of assimilating the night into the day. This lighting, according to Heidegger, "... grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are..." (BW 175). The illumination of history that is made possible by the presencing of the earth is further assimilated
by the light which accompanies our passages to the openness of the circle of meaning and forgetfulness, where man always returns to himself.

Irigaray contrasts Heidegger’s use of the sun and horizon with the transparency and fluidity of the night. She claims that “...she (air) can only be heard when she cries in the night,” and that “in the apparition of the night, when the sun is down, it is possible to enter...” (Irigaray 45). It is interesting to look at Irigaray’s use of night to describe the location of the feminine (air). As her being is maintained in the nocturnal cover, she uses the metaphor that is usually associated with anxiety, despair, lostness, and darkness and is also associated with metaphors often denoting race (Irigaray 106). This is significant because she is maintaining the same kind of difference, the difference between night and day, that has traditionally categorized and exorcized woman from the realm of man. Irigaray opts to find difference in the pathway of the night that not only shows us “a” way, but allows for many ways to emerge and confront each other without the blinding gaze of the sun.

V

As we grasp Irigaray’s critique of Heidegger’s use of logos, historicity, and metaphor, it is useful to examine the traces of the Heideggerian paradigm in Irigaray’s own work. Her work undeniably provides us with a provocative and revolutionary way of re-conceptualizing the role of the feminine in the philosophical tradition, yet, her work also remains within Heidegger’s shadow. In her essay “Irigaray Reading Heidegger,” Joanna Hodge addresses Irigaray’s use of Heidegger’s “origin.” Irigaray’s pronounced understanding of the matricide that has plagued Western interpretative standards has arguably stemmed from “the originary from which a particular discursive formation is to stay in place.... An originary event articulates itself as omnipresent and recurrently affirmed set of parameters that open up certain lines of possibility while closing off others” (Hodge 202). Hodge wants us to understand that Irigaray’s practice in “looking for the silencing gesture of the alternative voices” is
made possible because of a methodology that was first recognized by Heidegger’s understanding of history, temporality, and unconcealment (Hodge 194). Heidegger writes: “the preconception shackles reflection on the Being of any given being.... We ought to turn toward the being, think about it in regard to its Being, but by means of this thinking at the same time let it rest upon itself in its very own essence” (BW160-1). Hodge clarifies this for us, explaining that the notion of the origin in history has everything to do with finding oneself in some sort of eternal return to sameness. This is the eternal return that Irigaray wants to avoid, yet simultaneously uses in order to evoke her notion of the forgetfulness of air.

However, Hodge directs us towards Heidegger’s later analysis of technology and claims that this marks the next prominent difference between Heidegger and Irigaray. Heidegger’s discussion of the residues of technology lead him to fear “... the distinction between what there is and human activity is eroded.... accomplished only at the cost of abolishing the autonomous existence of the objects of thought: putting wholly what there is at the disposal of human beings and our destructive urges” (Hodge 205-6). Heidegger grounds this fear in his earth metaphor (see previous section) and this is where Irigaray immediately objects. Hodge correctly maintains that Heidegger’s later work asserts that the paradox of the twentieth century is “the impossible logic of technology is to destroy what there is and replace it with human activity and its products.... working toward the destruction of the earth” (Hodge 206). Irigaray finds similar problems with the appropriation of the sameness that obliterates sexual difference. But, she finds that instead of trying to save the earth, “there is a kind of change blowing over the earth’s surface, disturbing the logic of sameness that lies concealed in Heidegger’s invocation of the earth” (Hodge 207). It is clear that the change that is blowing is wind. It is not blowing in the wind, but it is the recognition of air that can salvage the earth. She proposes that Irigaray is moving towards a space where “woman can disrupt the exclusiveness of philosophy.... the issues themselves are likely to
shift” (Hodge 207).

However, while Irigaray investigates and reads Heidegger’s corpus using her air metaphor, representing the feminine, it may be wise on the part of the reader to be cautious when evaluating her analysis. Irigaray provides an extremely compelling and creative understanding of why Heidegger does not escape from metaphysical foundations that are the “origin” of the matricide and sublimation of the feminine. She is able to flush out Heidegger’s dangerous commitment to a logos that sets the stage for language, historicity, and authenticity, all of which are articulated by the intense use of metaphor. But, one must also be cautious and worrisome when she returns to the same Greek conception of the foundational elements that create the world. Her return to the elements, while understood strategically as a counter-movement to Heidegger’s his own historical preferences and foundations, is a foundation that reflects an essentialist position that resides in her own metaphor of air. Why does Irigaray posit sexual difference (as opposed to racial difference or other kinds of difference) as something that is originary and essential as the four elements?

While Irigaray attempts to use air to locate the feminine as that which offers fluidity and flexibility, she returns to a concept of femininity that is universalized. Statements that organize themselves around universal understanding of “her” and “man” can easily misconstrue an understanding of a clear and unproblematic reading of gender identity and creation. It might be important to make some sort of distinction, which is often evoked, but not enough in Irigaray’s work, between the appropriation of air and air itself. Although the difference between these two descriptions is, itself, not necessarily clear, as Irigaray does answer that air is only appropriated, it is necessary to have an understanding that does not bleed into a reading of air as the original and natural place of woman. This kind of reading could extend into a positing of the feminine and masculine that is only articulated in static metaphors, whether they are earth and air or descriptives such as masculine or feminine. If we are
trying to create a sphere to recognize sexual difference, or any kind of difference, then we must utilize a methodology that works with the intention of further deconstructing the identities that are subsumed by what we understand as masculine/feminine and male/female. Irigaray returns to the Greek historical framework to discover that the appropriation of air is responsible for the continued prevalence of matricide and the forgetfulness of the feminine. However, it is not clear after reading her analysis, whether she would be willing to posit and use a terminology that does not reinscribe these differences as being masculine and feminine. Irigaray does an exceptional job as an interpreter of Heidegger, but one may want to worry about her own commitments to creating an alternative terminology. In the very moment of counter-acting Heidegger's presencing, it is imperative that we not re-articulate the same ground with a counter-terminology or counter element that is supposed to embody the complexities of difference(s).

Yet, after providing this critique, it is fair to acknowledge that Irigaray is aware of the problems surrounding air and may address these problems with her metaphor. If we understand air as only an appropriation of womanhood, as something that has been named by the earth and its commitment to presencing, then we have flexibility in our understanding of womanhood. Then the question would no longer be posited around a "liberation" of air, but rather an intense re-examination of the earth. Furthermore, the metaphor of air does provide a strong foundation for the maintenance of difference on the level of never being able to be seen as something clear or static. Instead, as Irigaray does mention in her work, it preserves differences. But, in light of these positive and productive readings, one may inquire as to what kinds of other differences exist and whether those differences could not be accounted for in the appropriation of air and whether air may not be too "transparent" to address issues such as race and ethnicity. Furthermore, are these differences as "natural" as the Aristotelian elements?

In conclusion, Irigaray's creative and exciting critique of
Heidegger accurately shows that his use and understanding of logos, while not rooted in the mere presence or present, is still committed to a presencing that requires forgetfulness and the concealment of differences. She addresses his commitment to presencing through language and her use of metaphor leads us to examine Heidegger’s authentic Being-towards-death and historicity as intensely problematic. Irigaray also intensely focuses on Heidegger’s use of metaphor and descriptives. She examines his fascination with the illumination and the brightness of fire, his obsession with the earth, as well as his use of silence. By focusing on these elements, Irigaray aims to show, just as her other investigations into the Western philosophical tradition, how the appropriation of difference has “originated.” She develops Heidegger’s own notion of forgetfulness to account for this phenomenon, recognizing her own commitment to some of the more productive implications of his work, as discussed by Hodge. Irigaray shows that the historicity and presencing that Heidegger suggests as being core to the true understanding of the unconcealment of Being, is rooted in a maintenance of assimilation and sublimation.

Still, as we examine Irigaray’s own incredible response to Heidegger’s problem, we find that it could be laden with overarching assumptions as well. While Hodge indicates that the productive critique of Irigaray shows how women have been named and appropriated, it is also necessary to be cautious when addressing elements that are deemed to be essential and natural. It vital that we draw a distinction between being named and re-articulating that name. Irigaray’s use of “he” and “she” implicitly suggests that she is merely re-articulating the historical use of these names, but she does not explicitly claim that these distinction are any more complicated than “masculine” and “feminine.” Her rooting sexual difference in the naturalness of the elements could fail as theoretical models that try to work away from the naturalness of the sex/gender distinction. These models may not show how other differences are just as important when investigating the negative recogntory techniques present in
the Western philosophical tradition. Irigaray's discussion of Heidegger, provocative and invigorating, leads towards an evaluation of Heidegger that allows us to utilize his work without subscribing to the illusion that he can escape the economy of presence and masculinity that emerges in his discourse.

**Works Cited**


