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Episteme

Abstract

Kripke’s Naming and Necessity argues for an odd form of necessity with regard to identity statements. This paper demonstrates that such oddness is due to internal inconsistency and the falseness of Kripke’s notion of rigid designation. The author first examines Kripke’s philosophy of language which covers necessary vs. contingent, necessary vs. a priori, and the overturning of Kant with the claim that a necessary truth can be an a posteriori truth, like “Hesperus is Phosphorous.” Following Michael Wreen’s systematic understanding of Kripke’s argument, and agreeing with the logic of David Bostock’s and Helen Steward’s criticisms of Kripke, which challenge Kripke about possible worlds viz. the problematic notion of rigid designation, the author argues that the four elements of Kripke’s argument all demonstrate contingent truths, not necessary ones.

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